

THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL

PUBLISHED BY THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION OF THE
MIDDLE WEST AND SOUTH, WITH THE CO-OPERATION
OF THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW ENGLAND
AND THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION OF THE PACIFIC STATES

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Volume XII

OCTOBER, 1916

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THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL

VOLUME XII

OCTOBER 1916

NUMBER 1

Editorial

THE COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATIONS IN LATIN IN JUNE, 1916

This year for the first time the College Entrance Examination Board reigned supreme. There were no entrance examinations given by any individual college. Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, like all other colleges, are now to be entered by examination only through the Board. All papers were given by the Board and all answer-books were rated by the Board's readers, except those of candidates entering under the New Plan.

There were 61 Latin readers this year, twice as many as we had two years ago, and the number of answer-books was double that of 1915. The number of days' work on the part of each reader was about 11, slightly under the average for the last few years. A considerable majority of the Latin readers now represent the schools, but the writer's careful observation leads him to assure the colleges that they have no ground for complaint on this score. The readers from the schools are at least as strict, accurate, and conscientious as those from the colleges.

With so large a corps of Latin readers, twenty-six of whom were new this year and had to be "broken in," the duties of the chief reader, Professor McCrea, were immensely increased and rendered far more difficult. In spite of this he conducted the reading as justly and as faithfully as ever. The reading moved along with perfect smoothness and there was only the highest praise for the man who kept the machine in running order. In each group some

of the duties usually performed by the chief reader were delegated to one of the older readers.

Of the results of the examinations in particular it is too early to speak. For these we must await Professor Fiske's report on all the examinations in October and Professor McCrea's instructive and delightful paper on the Latin examinations next April. However, the general impression of the Latin readers was that the examinations were highly successful in every way. All of the papers were excellent, and, while the writer knows that the readers were as strict as ever, the candidates seemed to be passing in larger numbers than usual. There is a fair chance that Professor Fiske's report will show Latin to be the best taught subject in America, thus giving the most effective answer to Mr. Flexner's absurd dictum that Latin should be dropped from the curriculum, not simply because it *is not* but because it *cannot* be properly taught. (In his latest effusion on "Parents and Schools" in the July *Atlantic* Mr. Flexner says that a parent, intending to enter his child in a school where Latin, mathematics, and other useless subjects were required, should, "like the man from Missouri, require 'to be shown.'" Several excellent replies have been made to the pamphlets of this scholar and of ex-President Eliot, but for the reply that promises to be most complete we must await that by Headmaster Stearns, of Andover, in an early number of the *Atlantic*. No particular answer to this latest article is necessary. Teachers will welcome the closest attention of parents to their children's courses of study. Moreover, in these days, with so much literature and so many statistics at hand, he must be a very poor principal or Latin teacher who cannot show the parent *why*.)

Without doubt the greatest interest this year centered around the Comprehensive paper. The readers wondered what it would be like and what would be done with it. The preparatory teachers and students seem likewise to have wondered, for only a few candidates took the examination. Candidates not sure of themselves will probably always avoid the New Plan of admission, but now that the character of the paper is known it is practically certain that many candidates will take the Comprehensive examination next year. There were not quite 500 answer-books under the New Plan,

and these were sent to the colleges concerned, four-fifths of them going to Harvard. The Board's Comprehensive paper and the New Plan paper were identical: 455 candidates took this paper of the Board and the answer-books were read by a special group formed from the colleges and schools most interested.

Since it was the first paper of the series, there were naturally some faults to be found with it. One or two questions were not as carefully chosen as they might have been, and the passages for translation, intended to test the candidate's knowledge of Latin at the end of the second year, of the third year, and of the fourth year, proved to be of nearly equal difficulty. These defects will surely be removed next year.

At this session the sixty-one Latin readers were unevenly divided into six groups. Each set of answer-books was assigned for rating to one group of readers and no group as a whole was allowed to help another finish its quota of books. It was known from the beginning that the number of candidates in Latin 4—Cicero, with which the writer's time was occupied—was much larger than that taking any other examination. This group, therefore, received the largest number of readers, i.e., fourteen. After a few days two of these were withdrawn to serve on the new group to read the Board's Comprehensive paper, and a little later three or four readers were detailed from other groups to help out with Latin 4. The average number of readers in Latin 4 was about fifteen or sixteen. A year ago in this subject there were 1,200 candidates. This year we had about 2,500! Also, the interesting fact was noted that, after six and a half days' work on the part of this enlarged group, we still had more books to read than we had in the beginning a year ago! In this case, as in all others, keeping steadily at it brought success, and we were able to finish our work on time. Certainly fewer books required rereading, which means that more passed.

Of the results in Latin 4 the writer could say a great deal, but this is hardly the place to single out one examination for extended comment. I should like to say, however, that the translation of the passage from the *Archias* (section 19) and the sight translation were, as a rule, well done. The questions on the prepared passage were handled just about as successfully as last year, when

the candidates made an unusual record in this particular. Still, some facts did seem astonishing. It is remarkable that any candidate can study Latin at least three years and yet know nothing worth while about the stories connected with the names of Orpheus, Amphion, or Marius. That many candidates should fail to remember the reference in *igitur* was not astonishing. Of the small number of answer-books that I was able this year to read for the first time only one-fourth properly explained what *igitur* was doing in Cicero's sentence. More than one-third apparently knew nothing about the stories of Orpheus or Amphion, while nearly one-fourth were totally ignorant of Marius. More than half failed absolutely to locate Smyrna. On this one candidate wrote, "It was either on the coast of Asia Minor or of Sicily. (Probably neither.)" An honest candidate is certainly a noble creation, but it would have been better for this one had he been taught to state his answer as accurately as he knew how, and *not* in alternative form! If he had put a period after the word "Minor" and omitted the rest of the answer, he would have received full credit. As it was, he got nothing.

About three-fourths of my small number of books received full credit for the question about Homer. Even in the good books there were misspellings of the words *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. One of our readers made a collection of nearly thirty of these, "Illiad," "Illyad," and "Ilyiad" being so common that after a while we almost came to the belief that these were correct! Putting together some of the "information" gleaned from the poorer books, probably the work of candidates not recommended, we learned that "Homer was a Greek and Latin poet, who wrote the *Illiad* and *Odissy*, the *Aeneid* (or *Aenied*), the *Vergil*, the *Odes*, and *Epodes* the *Xenophon*, and other literary works. He was considered a past master in Greek literature and always ended his poems with 'Carthage must be destroyed.' "He was an ancient Greek writer of Latin." Quite a number said that "Homer wrote the *Aeneid*, which Vergil afterwards copied." In the same way Marius was "the man who killed many by his prescriptions. He fought against the Cimbricans and the Teutoni; he defeated Hannibal at Zama and was called 'the Shield of Rome.'"

A few books were discovered, completely done, but to which no credit worth mentioning could be given. One of these contained this sentence in the prepared translation: "The poets who are dead surely expect alienation for we repudiate our life, especially since we have so much of it." Another wrote, "They responded to the voice with stones and sticks, and these consisted of immense boulders." In the sight translation of the former of these candidates occurred this bit of thoughtful work: "Cn. Pompey, when he had seen that a petition was thrown into his camp, tore this man from the ensign of kings, but because he had thrown him from his head, he replaced him. . . ."

This brings me to the most important part of this long editorial, and with regret I note that I must be brief. A word to the wise, however, is always sufficient, and my readers will easily be able to read between these few lines the extensive essay I might have written. It is an old, old subject, but one on which enough can never be said, or at any rate the advice can never be completely acted upon.

First, our pupils should be thoroughly made to understand that the Latin authors *meant* something when they wrote and that, therefore, the translation must *mean* something. The student may not get the right meaning, but if he gets something that shows intelligence and if he expresses it well, he has at least accomplished something. In arriving at the meaning he must let the Latin word-order and the endings help him as much as possible. If he understands these things, he needs no other assistance.

Secondly, we should to the utmost of our time and ability insist upon the use of good English. Our students to the limit of their ability must be made to avoid that "jargon of unnatural sounds called translation English." They must not translate *words* into wooden English, but they must express the thoughts of the Latin authors in the ordinarily good English that most of them use in conversation. A student with a suitcase in his hand never says to his friend on the day vacation begins, "I am seeking New York," and he should not in section 19 of the *Archias* translate, "Many others fight and contend among themselves." In this latter case the Latin readers may suppose the candidate to understand that actual

battles on this question did occur, and many candidates explained clearly that this was their understanding of the passage.

The first sentence of the sight passage began with *cum*, "with," and ended with a *cum*, "since," clause. I kept no statistics on this point, but I believe that I read several scores of books that made two dependent clauses out of this sentence and gave it no main clause. This should have been impossible in all but a few illiterate books. On the other hand, several candidates showed their understanding of Latin and their power to use English by beginning the translation of the *Homerum Colophonii* sentence in some such way as this: "Take Homer, for instance. . . ." Why did Cicero put *Homerum* first in this sentence? These candidates showed that they knew why and also knew how to match the thought in English. Of course, the translation must not degenerate into a paraphrase, but the candidates should always be made, as far as possible, to employ good, natural, logical English.

I know what my colleagues in the profession will say in reply to all this, and I am only too ready to admit my own shortcomings; but at the opening of this bright new year of work let us all highly resolve to preach this old gospel with renewed force and without ceasing.

M. N. W.

THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION OF THE PACIFIC STATES

Apart from the Pacific Coast and the states immediately adjacent, the territory of the United States has hitherto been covered by three strong associations of classical teachers, namely, the Classical Association of New England, the Classical Association of the Atlantic States, and the Classical Association of the Middle West and South. Feeling that teachers of the classics on the Pacific Coast would profit by closer organization, and, in particular, by securing an official organ devoted to matters pertaining to the teaching of Latin and Greek, the three classical associations on the Pacific Coast met in joint session on July 12-13, 1916, at Berkeley, California, and there formally merged themselves into a new organization to be known as the Classical Association of the Pacific States, thus completing a country-wide organization of the teachers of the

classics. At the same meeting terms of affiliation offered by the Classical Association of the Middle West and South were accepted. By this arrangement the *Classical Journal* has become the official organ of the new Association, and three representatives from the Pacific States were given places on the Editorial Board, as follows: as managing editor for the Pacific States, Professor Herbert C. Nutting, of the University of California; as associate editors, Miss Bertha Green, of the Hollywood High School, Los Angeles, and Miss Juliann Roller, of the Franklin High School, Portland.

The terms of affiliation entered into by the Classical Association of the Middle West and the Classical Association of the Pacific States are identical with the original terms of affiliation with the Classical Association of New England. We most cordially welcome this new accession to our ranks, and may all congratulate ourselves that now the entire classical interests of the country are completely organized and firmly bound together. The *Journal* has already received helpful contributions from Professors Nutting, Fairclough, and others of the Pacific Coast, and we look forward to active co-operation with these our new allies.

CLASSICS IN SUMMERTIME—ADDENDUM

In our article on the above-named subject in the June number of the *Journal* we inadvertently omitted mention of the summer programs offered by the classical departments of the University of Virginia and of the George Peabody College for Teachers (Nashville). We tender apologies to Professor Fitz Hugh of Virginia and to Professor Little of Peabody, and to all others whose programs we may have overlooked. The attendance in the classical courses offered, so far as has been reported, has been very gratifying.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GALLIC CAMPAIGNS

BY MAX RADIN
Newtown High School, New York City

We understand by the term "international law" a series of rules by which nations have agreed to regulate their conduct with one another. The agreement, however, is not an actual, but a constructive, one. Most of these rules have never been formally accepted by the nations concerned. The agreement is inferred from the fact that the rules have been constantly obeyed, or that a violation of them has been denounced or treated as a ground for war, or that the enforcement of them to the nation's detriment has passed without protest.¹

Now, there never was a time in the history of our Mediterranean civilization—as far as even the scantiest of our records go—when such rules were not in existence. At all times, therefore, the races of that civilization have possessed an international law. When we reach the time of Roman supremacy, that law had already become highly complex, because international relations in other respects had become complex.² The theoretical formulation of these rules was never attempted by Romans for the reason that national lines were themselves becoming first blurred and then effaced under the rapidly centralizing tendencies of the Roman imperial system.

It was, however, always apparent that international law was different from other law. The difference lay in the sanction. The

¹ Oppenheim, *International Law*, I, 17: "The customary rules of this law have grown up by the common consent of states." In so far as the agreements of the Hague Conferences are accepted by the various states, and confirmed by the judicial action of the Hague tribunal, or the judiciaries of the several states, international law will tend to take a statutory form.

² The statement that Rome had no international law, as we understand it, or that the *ius fetiale* was the Roman equivalent of it, is based on a curious misunderstanding of the sources. Only a few modern writers repeat the statement, but it still finds its way into handbooks. Cf. T. J. Lawrence, *Handbook of Public International Law* (1912), p. 12.

violation of other law subjected the offender to some definite penalty. The violation of international law did not seem to do so. And this difference has to many seemed so vital that it justified the denial of the term "law" to the rules governing international conduct. However, that difference can be overemphasized. We may, after all, construct a sanction for international law in the fact that its violation may lead to war or to hostile measures short of war. And, if it is objected that such a penalty can be enforced only if the aggrieved nation happens to be equal to the other in strength or superior to it, it may be replied that in the case of other laws the penalty is often not enforced because of the negligence or incompetence of the executive. At worst, therefore, international law has the same claim to be considered law as the law of badly governed communities. And while to resemble a badly governed community is no very lofty ideal for the commonwealth of nations, it is something better than frank and undisguised anarchy, and at least contains the promise of improvement.¹

The Romans had no specific name for international law. They knew it as part of the *ius gentium*, i.e., as part of those legal institutions which all or at any rate most nations had. Just as slavery was an institution of the *ius gentium*, because all nations known to the Romans possessed it, so the inviolability of ambassadors was such an institution. The Romans classified their terms differently from ourselves. But that they recognized the concepts involved is apparent from their whole history, and appears specifically in such phrases of the *Digest* as that of Hermogenianus (*Dig. i. 1. 5*): "ex hoc iure gentium introducta bella, discretae gentes, regna condita."²

What was the source of this branch of the law for the Roman and for ourselves? It has been seen that there never was an enactment of it within the nations concerned. The source can be discovered only in practice. When Grotius laid the foundations

¹ Some discussion of this matter is found in every manual of international law. Cf. especially the article in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v.; Maine, *International Law*, p. 50; and Amos, *Science of Law*, p. 253.

² Gaius *Dig. xi. 1. 5. 7*: "Quae ex hostibus capiuntur, iure gentium statim capientium fiunt"; Sallust *B. Jug. xxxv. 7*: "fit reus magis ex aequo bonoque quam ex iure gentium Bomilcar."

of the science of international law, his categories were framed in broad and general terms, but, in the main, they were classification of actual practice, often justified and explained by reference to moral theories, but occasionally left as irrational precedents.¹ The precedents are not necessarily of yesterday or the day before. Some of them are thousands of years old. But their validity or invalidity will depend, not on their nearness or remoteness in time, but on the similarity or dissimilarity of the physical conditions which surround the act they are designed to regulate.

Accordingly, when we deal with the international law observed by Caesar in his Gallic campaigns, we are by no means dealing with facts of purely historical interest. The precedents then created are precedents of international law—ours as well as that of the Romans. If a modern belligerent were to disregard a rule consciously followed by Caesar, the justification would lie in the fact that the conditions of modern warfare had changed so radically in the particular respect covered by that rule, that its observance would no longer be expedient. And, in that case, the rule would probably have been abrogated by deliberate and continued neglect since Caesar, or by a counter-practice, later than Caesar's and inconsistent with it. The burden of proof would rest with the belligerent that violated the rule.

International law, further, has this in common with all forms of law, that it is not its abstract formulation that is to be considered, but its interpretation, whether in words or acts.² And this interpretation, which alone invests law with any real significance, brings into play the personality of the interpreter. Active leaders of men are constantly confronted with the problem of adapting a formula

¹ Grotius' book, *De Jure Pacis et Belli Libri III*, was published in 1625. The modern science of international law is generally regarded as beginning with it. But the early civilians and canonists recognized the *ius gentium* as regulating the relations between nations both in war and in peace. So Gratian *Decretum* D. i. 9 (following Isidore *Hisp.* v. 6): "*Jus gentium est sedium occupatio, aedificatio, munitio, bella, captivitates, servitutes, postliminia, federa pacis, induciae, legatorum non violandorum religio, connubia inter alienigenas prohibita.*"

² Statutory law has always been jealous of interpretative processes and has sought to prevent them, often with severe penalties. Cf. *Constit. Tanta* 21; Amos, *Science of Law*, 61. In every case these attempts have been futile. In the case of a body of law concededly customary, interpretation is not merely permitted, but essential.

to life, and they must do so in accordance with the laws of their own character. Some men, for example, are legalists by nature, and prone to a certain pedantry in following legal rules. But Caesar was distinctly not a legalist. On the contrary, like many other men of first-rate genius, he was essentially revolutionary in his temperament and methods. Besides, his political training had been gained in the Gracchan revolutionary tradition. Formulas, legal or otherwise, doubtless tried his patience. Nor did he always seek to disguise his disregard of them by evasion. His intellect was too sharp and his Latin sense of reality too strong to permit him to palliate the unpleasantness of a fact by the tacit convention that it had not taken place.

And yet Caesar was a Roman, and something of the anxious pedantry of Roman stratagem had been acquired by him from his political experience. It cost him a struggle to confess that in any given case he was deliberately overriding established law. The Nietzschean doctrine of "Beyond Good and Evil" would have stuck in the throat of this Roman superman. There is a common stereotype picture in the minds of many, depicting the Roman as a rigid and boweless exemplar of hard efficiency. That is more ludicrously inadequate here than elsewhere, when it is attempted to be forced upon this sensuous, cultivated, and humane gentleman, who happened also to possess one of the most incisive intellects of all time.

Given such a man, and a body of phenomena of the kind indicated, how were they applied in the great Gallic War that founded Caesar's prestige and power?

We must first gain a clear notion of Caesar's position at the beginning of the year 58 B.C. He was governor of Gaul, i.e., he was the wielder of the supreme *imperium pro consule* within the two provinces of Farther and Hither Gaul, to which had been added a less defined territory along the eastern Adriatic, known as Illyricum. The Latin word *provincia* is essentially abstract. It denotes rather a limitation of functions than a definite territory, though it is often loosely used in the latter sense. It is really somewhat akin to what we shall meet later as the "sphere of influence" of modern international law, although the method in which

the "influence" is protected was more open and direct than it is in our day. When we use the word *provincia* in its Latin sense, we shall have to keep in mind the following. Within a certain boundary there were groups of varied nature and origin. There were independent states, both city and territorial, some federated with Rome and others theoretically free. There were tribal communes and smaller civic centers which were the dependents either of the larger communities or directly of Rome, that dependence being indicated in the obligation of tribute or of military service. There were organized colonies of Roman citizens. There were further groups of Roman citizens scattered as travelers or merchants throughout the provinces, sometimes organized in corporate form, and sometimes not so organized. There were foreigners similarly scattered and organized. All these communities or groups had their own laws which they enforced by their own instrumentalities.

What made this heterogeneous gathering a single province? Simply the presence among them of a representative of the sovereign *populus Romanus*, elected for a definite period, and clothed with *imperium*—which may be characterized as supreme residuary power. To this representative an appeal lay from the decision or administrative act of any magistrate or official whatsoever. He might further entertain as a court of first instance any controversy between any persons either temporarily resident or permanently domiciled in the province, and he might interfere by administrative act, of his own motion, with any such person. In the case of the *liberae et foederatae civitates*, however, his jurisdiction was probably appellate only. From his decision no appeal lay to any tribunal on the face of the earth. The only check upon him was the possibility of being charged in Rome with maladministration, when his term of office was over, i.e., with violating his obligation toward the Roman state to govern its dependents properly. He was not deemed to have any legal obligations toward the provincials.

As far as Caesar's provinces were concerned, there was abundant opportunity for the application of the rules of international law within the provinces themselves. The ancient Greek city of Massalia, e.g., was an ally of Rome on terms of equality and still in theoretical possession of its power and dignity. With it there might have arisen conflicts that would have called into action the

practice and the ceremonial which Rome had instituted for such occasions. But no such conflict either with Massalia or with any other free or federated state seems to have arisen for the eight years of Caesar's government. The *imperium* of the *populus Romanus* met with ungrudging obedience.

Outside the province the Romans had established certain relationships. First of all, as early as 122 B.C.¹ the Romans had made a treaty of alliance with the Aedui and either then, or at some later time, conferred upon them the title of *fratres populi Romani*. It is expressly stated that no Gallic tribe, before or after, was so distinguished.² As allies—*socii*—there were, of course, definite mutual obligations imposed by the treaty upon Romans and Aeduans. We do not know the exact terms of the treaty, but there are indications that it abounded in honorific epithets rather than in substantial concessions on the part of Rome. It was very plainly not a defensive and offensive alliance, and while it emphasized the perfect independence and equality of the high contracting parties, it left no doubt in the minds of other nations that the relation was little different from a clientage of the Aeduans toward the Romans.³

The title of *fratres populi Romani*, to which such constant reference is made, seems to have been a mere phrase, devoid of legal significance.⁴

¹ Livy *Epit.* lxi. The Aedui are there called *socii*, and we may well assume that the alliance was made *ad hoc*, i.e., to give the Romans a pretext for attacking the Allobroges (121 B.C.).

² Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 25: "Primi Aedui senatorum in urbe ius adepti sunt. Datum id foederis antiquo et quia soli Gallorum fraternitatis nomen cum populo Romano usurpant"; Strabo iv. 2 (C. 192): *οἱ δὲ Αἰδοῦοι καὶ συγγενεῖς Ῥωμαίων ὀνομάζοντο καὶ πρῶτοι τῶν ταύτῃ προσήλθον πρὸς τὴν φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν*. The inscription quoted from Gruter in the Forcellini *Lex.*, in which the Batavi are called *fratres P.R.* (Orelli 176, 177), is almost certainly a late forgery. In Pliny *N.H.* iv. 107, the Aedui are simply called *foederati*, as are also the Carnuteni. Two other tribes, the Meldi and the Segusiavi, are called *liberi* by Pliny, although Lugdunum in the territory of the Segusiavi had been a Roman colony since 44 B.C.

³ *Bell. Gall.* ii. 14. 3.

⁴ The passages quoted seem to say that other tribes, although not Gallic tribes, were at some time called *fratres*. No doubt the employment of the phrase as a term of compliment occurred in several public documents. It was often due to a legend, or perhaps gave rise to a legend, of real kinship between the peoples, as in the case of Saguntum (Sil. Ital. i. 608, 655, "Roma consanguinea Sagunti"). Lucan *Phar.* i. 427 has "Arvernique ausi Latio se fingere fratres sanguine ab Iliaco," where Arverni is used by a kind of metonymy for Aedui. Cicero often refers jestingly to "*fratres nostri Aedui*" (*Ad Att.* i. 19. 2; *Ad fam.* vii. 10); cf. Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, III, 589, 1153; *CIL*, VIII, 309 27 "(populum R) omanum cognatum amicum socium."

The Aeduan treaty had been confirmed by frequent references to it in the decrees of the Senate. Further, the Aeduans had been used as one of the pretexts for aggression in Gaul almost as soon as the treaty was made. This fact of itself gave Roman influence an extension beyond the borders of the province, and the possibility of this extended influence had been expressly recognized in a *senatus consultum* of 61 B.C.¹

Besides the Aeduans, the Romans had entered into other relations in Gaul. Some years previously the *condottiere* of a band of German mercenaries had settled in Sequanian territory. In 59 B.C., at his own request, his title of "king" was recognized by the Senate and he was further officially styled *amicus populi Romani*. This established between him and Rome the relation of *amicitia*. While this involved no more definite legal rights than *fraternitas* or *fraternal nomen*, it did create certain reciprocal, if vague, duties.² Other kings, at various times, had had their titles recognized by Rome, but there was no other case of *amicitia* still subsisting in 58 B.C.³

Further, about 121 B.C., Q. Fabius Maximus conquered the Allobroges and, at the same time, the Arverni and Ruteni. The Allobroges were ultimately incorporated into the province. The

¹ *Bell. Gall.* i. 35. 4.

² Cf. an article by Neumann in the *Pauly-Wissowa Realencycl.*, I, 1832. Cicotti, s.v. *amici*, in Di Ruggiero, *Dis. Epig.* Pomponius, commenting on Quintus Mucius, enumerates *amicitia*, *hospitium*, *foedus*, as the three relations that may subsist between nations at peace (*Dig.* xlix. 15. 5. 2). The ancient treaty between Rome and Carthage established *φιλία* not *συμμαχία*; cf. Polyb. iii. 22. 24. *Amicitia* established by treaty as between the Romans and Carthage in the instance cited, between the Romans and Antiochus (Polyb. xxi. 45), between the Romans and Rhodes (Polyb. xxx. 5), is, of course, a different thing from the informal *amicitia* derived from a honorific locution in a decree of the Senate. None the less, the latter also established the relation. We have preserved a *senatus consultum* of such a kind in the *S.C. de Asclepiade*, *CIL*, I, 203; Bruns, *Fontes*, 167. Only the Greek part is preserved in full, vss. 10-11: *ἔδοξεν Ἀσκληπιάδην Πολύστρατον Μενέσκον ἄνδρας καλοῦς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καὶ φίλους προσγορεῖσθαι*; cf. vs. 24: "(uteique Q. Lutatius, M.) Aemilius cos., a.a., s.e.v. eos in amicorum formulam referundos curarent, eis (que tabulam aheneam amicitiae in Capitolio ponere)." It is just such a *relatio in amicorum formulam* that the Senate had probably voted in the case of Ariovistus; cf. "referte in sociorum formulam" (Livy xliii. 6).

³ Catamantaloedis, the Sequanian, had received similar recognition (*Bell. Gall.* i. 3. 4); also, Ollovico, king of the Nitiobroges (*ibid.* vii. 31. 5).

others had not been so incorporated, but the fact of the conquest gave Caesar an argument in his negotiations with Ariovistus.

Finally, while the Allobroges were within the confines of the province, some Allobrogian villages were still outside of it and the inhabitants of these villages were in constant communication with the rest. There were also Allobrogian *possessions*, which ought to mean tribal land used either for pasture or for agriculture and perhaps leased out to individuals or communities, across the Rhone.

This was the situation, as far as foreign relations were concerned, that Caesar found when he entered Gaul. With one foreign tribe, the Helvetians, he came into immediate conflict, and that conflict presents a number of interesting questions.

Caesar treats the Helvetians as at war with Rome. Upon what grounds? No declaration of war or of warlike intentions had come from them. Their only pronouncement on the subject had been a formal disavowal of such intentions. We hear, it is true, that they had decided to treat with the Allobroges separately and force a passage if it was not conceded (i. 6. 3), but that is a purpose inferred by Caesar. He gives us no hint of his evidence for it. The conduct of the Helvetians had been scrupulously correct. A formal and conspicuously honorable legation waited upon the commander (i. 7. 3), assured him of their peaceful intentions, and asked for what they themselves acknowledge to be a privilege.

But without a declaration on either side, had the Helvetians committed an act of war? Caesar maintains they had done so (i. 14. 3). He cites three such acts. First, they attempted an actual invasion of Roman territory (i. 8. 4); secondly, they seized and destroyed property belonging to Roman allies, the Aeduans, and to Aeduan clients (i. 11. 3, 4); and, thirdly, they seized and destroyed property which, though outside of the province, belonged to a people actually subject to Roman *imperium*, the Allobroges, and therefore with a primary claim on Roman protection.

These acts are undoubtedly hostile. To attack a rampart manned by Roman troops on Roman territory—as Caesar asserts the Helvetians did (i. 8. 4)—is to make war on Rome, if the attack was authorized or connived at by the responsible authorities. It is, however, far from clear that it was. Not only were there four

distinct tribes in this horde, the Rauraci, Latobrigi, Boii, and Helvetians, but the four Helvetian cantons probably had a separate military organization. The attack may have been the work of a few individual hot-heads. Caesar mentions no casualties. Nor had the Helvetians been given the least opportunity of clearing themselves or of offering reparation. Even if there was no assessable damage, at least a formal satisfaction might have been demanded.¹

On the second point Caesar professes to be carrying out his obligation to the *amici fratresque populi Romani*. An Aeduan embassy has duly complained of the outrages of the Helvetians. But here again *non constat*, but the Helvetians would have disavowed the act and offered reparation. It is demanded of them after the slaughter of the Tigurini. Why not before?²

But the very occurrences are not free from doubt. The ambassadors allege serious grievances. Their fields have been devastated, their children kidnapped, their towns stormed (i. 11. 3). These words are almost obviously rhetorical. The Helvetians (indeed any Gallic army) had scarcely the equipment to sack towns *en passant*. Injury of some sort was probably done. The mere passing through of three hundred and sixty-eight thousand people involved a certain amount of destruction of property. But if the Aeduan envoys are telling the truth, the temper of the Aeduans toward the Helvetians would certainly have been one of flaming indignation. And yet it plainly was far from being that. On the contrary, the active sympathy of a great many Aeduans is with the Helvetians. Not even Dumnorix' influence could have overridden resentment for such intolerable wrongs. The grain question shows

¹ As an example of how Caesar acts when he has no intention of making war, we may compare the case of the Pirustae (*Bell. Gall.* v. 1. 5-7). The Pirustae disavow: "nihil earum rerum publico factum consilio," and Caesar appoints commissioners "qui litem aestiment poenamque constituent." This was a case, we may further note, of actual invasion of Roman territory and the infliction of considerable damage.

² The Ambarri, Aeduan clients, likewise complain. Ordinarily, no doubt, the rule of private law, "socii mei socius meus socius non est" (*Ulp. Dig.* xvii. 2. 20), applied also to public. But in many cases, and very likely in the case of the Aeduan treaty, the allies of the parties are specifically referred to. Cf. the treaty with Carthage, already mentioned (*Polyb. op. cit.*): ἐπὶ τοῖςδε φίλιαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίων συμμάχοις.

that the ambassadors represented, not the Aeduan people, but at most the Roman party. Some Aeduans are in constant and treasonable communication with the Helvetians. Finally, after the war, one of these divisions of marauders is welcomed by the Aeduans as valuable and desirable citizens. Is that compatible with the memory of recent outrages? And are we to suppose that Helvetians would wantonly attack the people of their *affinis* and benefactor, Dumnorix? The doubt is one that Caesar's evidence does not resolve. All that the ambassadors say, if it is true, may be the amplification of isolated acts that would become a *casus belli* only if they were done with the actual or presumed authority of the tribe.

In the case of the Allobroges, the Roman grievance may have been better founded. But usage would have demanded that the Helvetians be allowed an opportunity of peaceable adjustment, even if everything that the refugees stated were literally true.

Finally, it may be pointed out that Caesar's invasion of foreign territory in pursuit of the Helvetians precedes the complaint of the envoys, and therefore antedates his knowledge of any injuries to the Aeduans or to the Allobroges (i. 10. 5).

As acts of war the charges against the Helvetians will not bear serious examination. It is a question of intention. If Caesar had not independently intended to make war, he would have acted quite differently. But he did intend to make war, and he scarcely tries to hide the reasons. They are twofold. First, the Romans had been defeated by a Helvetian contingent nearly fifty years before, and that defeat had never been avenged. Secondly, the establishment of the Helvetians in the Saintonges territory would be a danger to the state. That is to say, the movement of the Helvetians compromised the national honor and the national safety.

The statement that the projected settlement of the Helvetians would be uncomfortably near Roman territory is, of course, eminently disingenuous. They had been much nearer in their old lands. But there was a conceivable danger in the fact that disaffected Gauls should be allowed to pick out extremely desirable land at the mouth of the Loire. On the second point, we may find it absurd that the national honor should be deemed to be impaired

by a fifty-year-old defeat—a defeat that had been allowed to remain unavenged all that time. However, to Roman prestige in Gaul it was a real and permanent *iniuria*. And no one who has read the white, green, yellow, or blue papers so recently issued will assert that this was the most absurd form in which a nation's honor has been held to be involved.¹

It is, however, only imminent danger that could have justified the attack on the Helvetians. Caesar does not claim that he regarded the danger inherent in the Helvetian migration as imminent. Without imminent danger, the strongest statements of his reasons furnish at best a dubious justification, and as a dubious justification we must leave it.²

The second campaign of Caesar introduces many new problems. And these have been fully threshed out for us in the interesting diplomatic "conversations" between no less personages than Caesar himself and the Suabian Heerfuurst.³

Between the Romans and Ariovistus there exists the relation of *amicitia*. This is recognized by Caesar in requesting a conference. His request is curtly refused in terms that almost negate the existence of *amicitia* (i. 34. 2-4). Caesar feels himself compelled to issue an ultimatum (i. 35. 3), and the demands of that ultimatum are unqualifiedly rejected. Both sides simultaneously begin hostilities.

¹ Age did not wither the Roman sense of injury. So Livy, writing under Augustus of the insolent Rhodian embassy of 169 B.C., says (xliv. 14): "ne nunc quidem haec sine indignatione legi audirive posse certum habeo."

² Convention III of the Second Hague Conference forbids nations to enter upon hostilities without a declaration of war or a qualified ultimatum. However, it is recognized that a hostile act of one nation, though constituting an international delinquency, does bring about a state of war (Oppenheim, *International Law*, II, 127). As to the rule that imminent danger excuses resort to violence, cf. *ibid.*, I, 185 f.; Pradière-Fodéré, tr. of *Droit international*, I, Nos. 211-86; Despagnet, *Cours* (4th ed.), Nos. 172-75. Nor must it be forgotten that the peril of a Helvetian war, and the remoter danger of an actual invasion of Italy, had been vividly present in Roman minds for at least two years. Cf. Cic. *Ad. Alt.* i. 19. 2: "Atque in re publica nunc quidem maxime Gallici belli versantur metus. . . . Helvetii sine dubio sunt in armis excursionisque in provinciam faciunt; . . . legati . . . darent operam ne eae [i.e., Galliae civitates] se cum Helvetiis coniungerent." This was written in 61 B.C.

³ That the name "Ariovistus" is equivalent to the German *Heerfuurst*, and is rather a title than, a name is, of course, only one possibility out of many others equally plausible.

So far we have a strict observance of the form of international law as it existed then, and as it exists now. The next matter to consider is whether the issuance of an ultimatum was justified.

Following his usual procedure, Caesar discloses his motives almost immediately (i. 33). And as usual he finds the honor and the safety of the state concerned in the controversy that arises. It has at all times been admitted that questions of this nature, i.e., those that involve the honor or the safety of the state, are not justiciable.¹ If, therefore, this is such a question, Ariovistus' refusal to negotiate leaves Caesar scarcely any choice. But is it? The safety of Rome, says Caesar, cannot admit so dangerous a precedent as a successful invasion of Gaul by Germans. Such an invasion might be the beginning of another general migration like that of the Cimbri and Teutones (i. 33. 4).

The danger was real enough; but that the Romans were in law and morals estopped from setting it up seems too clear to require comment. The invasion of Gaul was no new thing. After its successful completion, the Senate had confirmed it by the recognition of Ariovistus as king and by the granting of *amicitia*. No doubt the Senate was induced to do so by the Helvetian danger, now permanently set aside; but the sudden *volte-face* that could welcome Ariovistus into Gaul one year and regard his presence as a menace the next makes us somewhat dizzy. There was, however, a new element in the situation—the arrival of the Harudes. This was a legitimate subject for *pourparler* and “conversation,” but it will be seen that, although Caesar makes the point, he does not dwell on it.

Besides the safety of the state, its honor, too, was involved. Roman allies had been forced into a humiliating peace with Ariovistus. That could scarcely help being conceded, but the sufficient answer was that the Romans had waived any claim they could possibly have on this ground by entering into relations of *amicitia* with Ariovistus with full knowledge that such a peace had been made.

¹ Treaties of arbitration at the present time generally exclude questions affecting the nation's vital interests, its independence, or its honor. The very important provision of the recent American treaties negotiated with England and France to the effect that the decision whether such a question was involved should itself be arbitrated was stricken out by the Senate.

Caesar's statements are, accordingly, pretexts which he must have recognized to be such. But whatever their value, Ariovistus has committed the blunder of furnishing an unimpeachable ground for an ultimatum. An ultimatum is considered justifiable if negotiations have been protracted to the danger point, or if they have been altogether refused. The conditions of Caesar's time do not admit of negotiations being carried on by the dispatch and answering of carefully worded notes. Negotiations were oral, if they were carried on at all. Caesar has duly presented an opportunity for them (i. 34. 1), and Ariovistus' reply makes further parley impossible.

In effect, the ultimatum contains two demands: first, "ne quam multitudinem hominum amplius trans Rhenum in Galliam transduceret"; secondly, "obsides quos haberet ab Aeduis redderet" (i. 35. 3). The first is thoroughly justified, but is practically disregarded in the subsequent discussion. The second is quite beyond Caesar's right to make. There is really no reply to Ariovistus' contention that he is enforcing acknowledged right, *ius suum* (i. 36. 3), and that Roman interference is an *iniuria* of a very measurable sort in that it lessens or threatens to lessen his revenues. There is no reply to that and Caesar attempts none. Instead, he sets his legions in motion.

A further conference occurs under highly dramatic circumstances (i. 43-45). Caesar presents the Roman case in the way already stated. Plainly, he can make no mention of the danger deemed to lie in the presence of Ariovistus himself. He stresses fully the point that Roman honor cannot permit the continued possession by Ariovistus of Aeduan hostages. Finally he demands the immediate cessation of German migration into Gaul.

Ariovistus refers again to the *ius belli* (i. 44. 2), on which he is unanswerable.¹ As to the Harudes and similar newcomers, his plea is that the apparent aggression is really a measure of self-defense—a plea with which we have grown somewhat familiar. But it is the complication introduced by the relation of the Aeduans to Rome that interests him. He finds at once the weak point in Caesar's argumentation by calling attention to the undisputed

¹ Caesar is not above citing the *ius belli* when it serves his purpose (vii. 41. 1).

fact that in very recent times the Aeduan alliance had not been interpreted as Caesar now interprets it. And finally he raises the question of priority.

Priority is, of course, a vital matter in the determination of rights in territory open to colonization or occupation, as our colonial history abundantly shows.¹ And as was the case there and more recently in Africa, priority of discovery must be carefully distinguished from priority of occupation. Ariovistus' claim that he was the first to enter the section of Gaul that is in dispute is readily enough refuted by Caesar (i. 45. 2); but Caesar himself concedes that the Romans had attempted no occupation of that territory. Now, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it was extensively held that discovery itself of territory open for appropriation conferred title. But during the nineteenth century it became established that such a title was merely inchoate, and became real only if within a reasonable time the occupation was made effective by means of the physical taking of the territory with the intention of acquiring sovereignty over it.² The question at issue between Ariovistus and Caesar is, therefore, a nice one, which would have been differently decided in Europe at different times.

The conference, we are told by Caesar, ended with a treacherous attack on the part of the Germans. As to that a certain skepticism is permissible. It is at least strange that, after such open perfidy, Ariovistus still believes that negotiations can be carried on (i. 47. 1), and still stranger that Caesar accedes to his request to send envoys to continue the discussion. But neither the treachery of Ariovistus nor his violation of the *ius legationis* can be taken as a basis for beginning hostilities. They had begun long before.

These first campaigns of Caesar have been fully treated because of their fundamental importance. Nothing can better illustrate

¹ Hakluyt, in his *Voyages*, bases the English claim to Virginia on the fact that "one Cabot and the English did first discover the shores about the Chesapeake." The claims of France to the same territory were based on the voyage of Verrazano, and those of Spain on those of Columbus. In all the cases mentioned priority of discovery only was asserted.

² Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, I, 294. The inchoate title conferred by discovery is considered a temporary bar to occupation by another state (Martens, *Nouveau Recueil général de traités*, 2d éd., X, 426) until, that is, the country claiming by discovery has had a reasonable time to attempt a physical occupation.

the nature of the law covering the matter or the way in which a man of Caesar's type would apply it. Perhaps he would have acted quite as he did if the rules of international law were wholly and unmistakably against him, but it is not at all certain that he would have done so, and he is plainly at considerable pains to bolster up his legal justification as completely as he can. In both cases he could allege technical justification, the attack on the Rhone rampart, the refusal to check further German migration. In neither case would these acts have been made a *casus belli* unless war had been determined on for reasons wholly extraneous to those alleged. That is an attitude that may be approved or not by canons of morality, but, as such, moral canons have not been incorporated into international law, even in modern times, if the continuous practice of the last five centuries is evidence of the law.¹

In one respect Caesar's practice occupies a higher moral ground than that of modern nations. It is expressly held by modern publicists that so-called uncivilized nations are at the present time outside of the application of international law—outside of the family of nations.² Caesar treats his controversy with these *barbari ac feri homines* as though it were as fully governed by *ius* as any controversy between independent sovereigns can possibly be. A persual of some modern and learned treatises on the subject might have saved him a certain amount of trouble.

¹ Professor Gray in his admirable *Nature and Sources of the Law*, p. 126, agrees with Austin that the rules of international law are simply "precepts of positive morality." That is due to his definition of law, which presupposes a court, and he consequently admits that with the establishment of the Hague tribunal (sec. 287) the rules of international law will become law "in the strictest sense." But as Professor Gray will allow the term "law" for rules that are habitually disregarded (*ibid.*, p. 103), everything depends upon the sense in which the term "court" is understood.

² The conditions under which states will be recognized as members of the "family of nations" are fully discussed in all modern books (Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-65). From time to time countries like Turkey and Japan, which formerly did not share that privilege, are expressly declared to be members of the family of nations. "The conduct of civilized states," we are told (Lawrence, *Handbook*, p. 4), toward other tribes than those in the family of nations, "should be regulated by the principles of justice and mercy." Hence, the massacre of Glencoe, and the slaughter of friendly and helpless Indians by Governor William Kieft of New Netherland.

The Romans also distinguished between those who were *iusti ac legitimi hostes* and those who were not (Cicero *De off.* iii. 29. 108). But it would seem that only the *communes hostes omnium*, such as pirates, were excluded from the class (*ibid.* 107).

In the second year of his proconsulship, Caesar's position was somewhat different. His active and successful interference in territory outside of his domain made Celtic Gaul a Roman "sphere of influence," in the sense in which it is understood in modern times. Anything that threatened the *status quo*, that upset the existing balance, was as such not merely a ground for legitimate apprehension, but could be considered a *casus belli*.

Now there can be no question that the formation of the Belgian confederation disturbed the *status quo* in Gaul. Caesar asserts that the confederation was directed against Rome, but he advances no proof that it was so. Evidence that it was the case would furnish ground for intervention. There is surely no trace of an overt hostile act directed against Roman troops or territory. But modern practice has permitted the construction of hostile intent from the fact of an alliance directed against a country or group of countries. Caesar's immediate and really unprovoked attack upon the Belgian confederacy (ii. 2. 6) has accordingly the sanction of international law, if we accept his version of the aims of the league, as we must perforce do. Caesar might further have advanced the thoroughly modern doctrine that formalities are generally dispensed with in dealing with half or wholly barbarous nations. There can be no reasonable question that the Belgians were in a notably lower state of culture than the Gauls or at least the Celts, who had large and prosperous cities, industries, and developed legal and religious institutions. Indeed modern law can profitably turn to Caesar's practice in this campaign for illustrations of moderation as well as severity in dealing with hordes of undisciplinable barbarians.

The whole question of the growth of a "sphere of influence" is well illustrated in the first few years of Caesar's proconsulship. When he first came into Gaul, it is not certain that serious disturbances among a people like the Arverni would have seemed to be a matter that touched him closely. Certainly a governor of a different stamp might have disregarded them. And yet, within four years, we find Caesar invading Aquitania, Trans-Rhenane Germany, and Britain. In nearly every case the pretext advanced was that the invasion was a measure of defense. In general, such

pretexts are tenuous in the extreme, but they are to be judged, not on general principles, but on the evidence advanced for each one of them. The danger of a German invasion was close enough and there seems also to have been a real danger of interference from Britain. But the Aquitanian expedition—a casual incident of the third year—was a different matter. There seem to have been no other considerations here than those of pure expediency. Caesar does say that he sent Crasus there, “ne ex his nationibus auxilia in Galliam mittantur” (iii. 11. 3), but he does not assert that aid was actually being sent. As a matter of fact, the great disparity in blood and language between Aquitanians and Celts makes it extremely unlikely that help was being prepared. And as to that disparity Caesar is himself a witness. The expedition was frankly one of conquest. Since Spain was Roman territory, and Celtic rapidly becoming so, the wedge of land between them could not be disregarded. Caesar no doubt reckoned that in the vastly more dramatic episode of the Veneti his flagrant disregard of a law would pass unnoticed.

The conquest of Aquitania, however much in disregard of acknowledged law, would have moved few Romans to protest. We know, however, of one act that did arouse Roman indignation, even if its expression may be discounted as partisan. This was the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri, or, better, one of the incidents that accompanied that massacre.

The circumstances were briefly these: Caesar has advanced against an invading horde of Germans. He submits terms for the consideration of which the Germans ask delay. Caesar regards their request as a pretext and continues his advance. His troops are attacked by a party of Germans. The attack is hastily disavowed by envoys dispatched for that purpose. Caesar chooses to disbelieve the disavowal, seizes the ambassadors, and attacks and slaughters the Germans. Cato moved in the Senate that he be delivered over to the enemy, and the Senate voted a commission to inquire into his conduct.¹ The *iniustum bellum*, which Suetonius tells us Caesar did not scruple to wage, may be this single incident expanded into a class. But it is more likely that it refers to the

¹ Suetonius *Divus Iulius* 24; Plutarch *Caesar* 22.

Gallic campaigns generally, no one of which but might have been avoided by a general scrupulously intent upon maintaining Roman rights without encroaching upon those of his neighbors.

Now, what was the offense for which he was to be surrendered? *Deditio* of a Roman general had been offered before. In the case of Mancinus, that commander was surrendered to the Numantians because the Senate declined to confirm a treaty he had negotiated. That was in accordance with a definite and well-established rule.¹ It may be, too, that the waging of an *iniustum bellum* would justify *deditio*. But the term *iniustum bellum* can mean only a war carried on in wilful disregard of the Roman manner of doing so. In a case like the present, hostile action of the horde undoubtedly justified war, and the commander's discretion was of necessity final as to the tribe's responsibility for the hostile act. It cannot, therefore, have been Caesar's severity or cruelty toward the Usipetes that was in Cato's mind. But Caesar had actually seized the persons of the German envoys (iv. 13. 6), an act that he himself denounced in connection with the Veneti as putting the offender almost outside of the pale of human intercourse (iii. 9. 3), and one that gave an added element of horror to the savagery of Ariovistus (i. 47. 3, 6).² The inviolability of an envoy was one of the few almost statutorily established rules of the *ius gentium*, and the act admitted of no excuse unless the envoys were themselves guilty of violating the *ius gentium* by actual participation in hostilities.³

Here, then, was a plain case that amply justified Cato's motion. The motion may have been taken seriously as the passage in Suetonius seems to imply, but in Cicero's extant correspondence for this time there is no reference to it. At any rate, this same Senate, a few months later, granted Caesar the unheard-of honor of a twenty days' thanksgiving (iv. 38. 5). As in other countries and at other times, a brilliantly victorious general has nothing to fear

¹ Cf. Cicero *De officiis* iii. 30. 109. Besides the case of Mancinus, there was the case of the consuls Veturius and Postumius after the battle of the Caudine Forks (321 B.C.), and also the tribunes, Numicius (Livy ix. 8. 13 gives his name "Livius") and Maelius.

² Nepos *Pelopidas* 5; Tac. *Hist.* iii. 80; Cic. *In Verr.* ii. 1. 33, 85.

³ Livy v. 36. 6: "Legati contra ius gentium arma capiunt." The sack of Rome by the Gauls is, in Livy's eyes, scarcely too severe a punishment for so grave an offense.

from an incidental violation of international law, unless his political opponents are strong enough to use it as a handle against him.

During the first four years of Caesar's proconsulship, he may be said to have been constantly aggressive. He turned a "sphere of influence" into a *de facto* province.¹ For Celtic Gaul, Belgium, and Aquitania, the Romans became not merely powerful neighbors who must on no account be irritated, but actual masters. Practically all of the tribes, except a few like the Menapii (vi. 5. 4), had entered into the formal relation of *deditio*; they are *dediticii populi Romani*. They have of course no rights in the *ius civile*, but the acceptance of their *deditio* gives them rights by the *ius gentium*. They are no Helots.² Without provocation they may not be killed for fancied reasons of state, perhaps not even expelled from territory once assigned to them or left in their possession. At any rate, a Roman official who did any of these things might be held answerable at Rome.

Thereafter Caesar's measures became defensive. That is to say, he was engaged, not in increasing the *imperium*, but in consolidating it, and he did so chiefly by warding off attacks upon it. Probably it would not have needed the supreme effort of the seventh year if it had not been that the first rebellion was so nearly successful. The disaster at Aduatuca occurred, we must remember, in the first real rising of Gaul. This memorable defeat of the Roman arms could not do otherwise than fire the imaginations of all Gauls. International law, however, regulates only to a limited degree the relations that subsist between a sovereign and its rebellious subjects. The general usages of warfare are still binding, and it is principally in connection with them that we derive material for international law from Caesar's later campaigns.³

It may be said at once that the measures he took against the Eburones, the massacre at Avaricum which he did not try to

¹ The formal creation of the province by means of a *lex provinciae* had of course not yet taken place. Caesar, however, does not wait for that act in Celtic Gaul as though it were part of his province. Cf. viii. 4: "cum [Caesar] ius diceret Bibracte."

² The *servitus* which the rebellious Gauls denounce is a figure of speech (cf. vii. 77. 3). Caesar, however, himself, uses the word (iii. 10. 3): "omnes autem homines natura libertati studere et condicionem servitutis odisse."

³ Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, II, 72.

prevent, and the bloody example of Uxellodunum do not exceed in severity what international law has always permitted against tribes guilty of treachery and barbarity. Modern civilized nations have been charged with equal or greater severity under circumstances of apparently less provocation.¹ Caesar, as a matter of fact, avowed that the interest of Rome was his sole guide in his dealings with rebellious Gaul. He is clement with powerful tribes whose aid he may still need, and severe with smaller ones when he desires a drastic example. We meet again the chief difficulty in discussing international law. It has very little binding force against the more powerful of the two litigants who appear before its tribunal, except that imposed by the nation's conscience as embodied in the individual conscience of the nation's representative. It is fortunate that such a sanction is not wholly ineffective. It certainly was not in the case of Caesar. The *maiestas populi Romani* that brooked no murmur of complaint under the most trying circumstances (vii. 17. 3) would equally have allowed no *hybris*, no arrogant trampling upon acknowledged right. Caesar's sophistry, in the few cases when he may be said to do that very thing, is in itself a recognition of the existence of the law.²

There are one or two topics that are especially well illustrated in Caesar's account, and to these we may turn. Chief among these is the relation of *editio*.

Modern wars end with a treaty of peace. The treaty recites the circumstances and sets forth the terms, i.e., the promises that the two sides make, which are mutual consideration for the permanent cessation of hostilities. That is true where one of the two sides is completely victorious and the other completely defeated, except

¹ Barclay, *Law and Usage of War*, s.v. "Reprisals," pp. 114-15; *Manual of Land Warfare* (British), sec. 458.

² A violation of the laws of war was felt by the Romans as a disgrace. Cf. Florus *Ep. de T. Livio* xxxv: "Aquilus Asiatici belli reliquias confecit, mixtis—nefas—veneno fontibus ad deditiōem quarundam urbium, quae res ut maturam ita infamem fecit victoriam, quippe cum contra fas deum moresque maiorum medicaminibus impuris in id tempus sacrosancta Romana arma violasset." This act, imputed here to Manius Aquilius, has been charged against all belligerents by their enemies, and is expressly prohibited by the Hague Regulations, 23, *e*. Cf. also *Manual of Land Warfare*, secs. 441-51. *Fas* and *Mos* seem, therefore, to have anticipated the Hague tribunal by more than two thousand years.

when, as in the case of the Boer War, the defeated party is wholly eliminated as a nation.

Ancient wars, however, ended with a treaty of peace only when mutual concessions were to be expected. Otherwise the defeated nation had no resource but surrender, *deditio*. The surrender of an individual on the field of battle involved the personal slavery of the surrendered man. *Deditio* was, in theory, nothing more than a multiplication of such individual surrender—a group surrender. It might involve the slavery of the whole group to the conquering group or to the chief of that group, and where it did not that was originally an unconstrained act of clemency.

The defeated party asks for peace, *pacem petit* (i. 27. 2; ii. 13. 3). That is of course implied in such phrases as *de pace venire* (iv. 36), *legatos de pace mittere* (iii. 28; iv. 27). In the use of the term *pax* as equivalent to submission, we may find *implicite* the ancient and almost universal view which made independent tribes, by the very fact of their independence, hostile to one another, so that a relation of *pax* between them implied the subjection of one to the other. A treaty of peace made on equal terms was, in very ancient times, a temporary truce. It is that conception that gives us such phrases as *omni Gallia pacata*, and especially such an expression as *male pacata* (Cic. *In Cat.* iii. 22).¹

Caesar gives the formula of *deditio* in various forms: "se suaque omnia in fidem atque potestatem populi Romani permittere" (ii. 3); "in fidem ac potestatem venire" (ii. 13); "se suaque omnia Romanorum potestati permittere" (ii. 31); "se civitatesque suas Caesari commendare" (iv. 27). All these are implied in the shorter form so often found, *se dedere, in deditionem venire* (vi. 3. 2; vi. 9. 6). Those who use it offer to become *dediticii populi Romani*,

¹ *Pax*, to be sure, ordinarily meant simply the negation of hostilities. Yet even the *pax* that the Helvetians propose to the Romans (i. 13. 3) has an element of subjection in that they promise to abide by Roman selection of a dwelling-place. In the passage from the *Digest* cited above (*Dig.* xlix, 15. 5. 2, from Pomponius' commentary on Quintus Mucius), a *pax* which involves no subjection is expressly recognized, but even here the older theory lurks: "In pace quoque postliminium datum est: nam si cum gente aliqua neque amicitiam neque hospitium neque foedus amicitiae causa factum habemus, hi hostes quidem non sunt, quod autem ex nostro ad eos pervenit, illorum fit." That is to say, the *pax*, based neither on a treaty nor on a *deditio*, has one of the essential elements of a state of war, viz., the application of *postliminium*.

a relationship which the acceptance of the offer at once creates. The offer implies a further promise *omnia imperata facturos* which so often accompanies the offer of *editio*, and this promise may be specified as it is in the case of the Remi (ii. 3. 3).

In all these phrases it is likely that the technically exact word is *permittere*. The primary sense of the word *mitto* seems to be to "let go," "cease to exercise control." The translation "send" implies a conscious direction, which the Latin word does not contain. *Se suaque permittere*, accordingly, means that they abandoned control over their own persons and property to the conquerors.

Of the other words, *potestas* explains itself. *Fides*, on the other hand, needs a little closer study. *Fides* was a term of wide extension and great importance at all stages of Roman private and public law. Perhaps it may best be described as the self-imposed obligation of one party to a transaction to carry out what he knows the other part expects to be carried out. *In fide alicuius esse* is used by Caesar as a variant for *in clientela esse* (vi. 4. 2; vi. 4. 5). And *clientela* of one tribe to another we often meet in Caesar. The relation was plainly one of dependency, and there seems to have been no difference between the relation of the various conquered Gallic tribes to Rome and the relation of the Bituriges to the Aedui. And just as the relation and the *fides* it implied might be created by voluntary submission, so it might be created by the act of a power superior to both, as when the Suessiones, after the breakup of the Belgic Confederation, became the clients of the Remi, themselves the subjects—we may properly say, "clients"—of the Romans. For this act the word *concedere* or *adtribuere* is generally used.

It may be that the somewhat unusual word *commendare*, cited above, is used by Caesar advisedly in the passage from which it is quoted. *Commendare*, at law, was equivalent to *deponere* (Dig. l. 16. 186), i.e., the creation of a gratuitous bailment. Neither side has legally enforceable obligations. So in the first campaign in Britain, the *commendatio* seems to have been merely a recognition of Roman suzerainty and not a definite *editio* involving the mutual obligations of *fides*. In the second campaign it is a full *editio* that is demanded (v. 20. 3).

Fides, as has been said, was mutual, as was the private relationship of *clientela* on which the public one seems to have been modeled. The promise *imperata facturos* covered everything, but the duties imposed were generally tribute, military service, and attendance upon the *concilia* when they were summoned. On the part of the superior tribe, it was protection which could be demanded as a right.

To fail in any of the specific duties imposed by *fides* was *deficere*, but *deficere* implied a deliberate act, equivalent to a declaration of independence. Any failure in these obligations which was not an open *defectio* was *fidem laedere* (vi. 9), and their maintenance was *in fide manere* (vii. 10).

We have so far been dealing with the offer of *deditio*. The relation is not created till it is accepted; for which act we have the phrases *accipere in deditionem*, *recipere in fidem*, etc. It might be refused. It is refused in the case of the Verbigeni (i. 28. 1) and in the case of the Veneti (iii. 16. 4). If it is refused, those who have offered it are still *hostes* ("in numero hostium esse, in numero hostium habere"), and as *hostes* they may be and are slaughtered without violation of law, human or divine. If it is accepted, they cease to be *hostes* and become *dediticii*. Their political status must be reconstituted for them by the conqueror. It generally takes the form of restoring the former territory and permitting local autonomy, subject to the ordinary obligations of subject nations. Sometimes the autonomy is complete, and no dues of any kind are imposed *suis legibus uti iubere* (i. 45. 3), *iura legesque reddere* (vii. 76); the state is *immunis*, as in the case of the Atrebates, and the obligations of *fides* are simply moral ones.

Deditio was essentially unconditional. People became *dediticii* or they did not. The term *condicio*, so often used in connection with surrender, refers rather to the situation existing after *deditio* than to the terms upon which the Gauls agreed to surrender. Certain *dediticii* were in a more favored position than others, and it was these varying positions of surrendered tribes that could be denominated *condiciones*. So the Nervii refused in advance to agree to any *condicio pacis* (ii. 15. 5), and when Q. Cicero tells Ambiorix that it is not the custom of Rome *accipere ab hoste armato*

condicionem, he means merely that no agreement as to what the *condicio* of a subject people was to be could be arrived at as long as that people was still in arms; essentially the same thing, therefore, as the statement of Caesar, "*deditionis nullam esse condicionem nisi armis traditis*" (ii. 32. 2). Ambiorix, in the former case, professes to desire no *defectio*. He wishes simply immunity from the presence of a Roman garrison, a privilege that many tribes, indubitably dependent, enjoyed. And Quintus sees no reason why that privilege cannot be granted. He even offers his good offices to secure it if it is made in proper form.

* Two other terms, *beneficium* and *officium*, are worth examining more closely. In both cases the ordinary or literary sense of the term is apparent enough and the special meaning that it acquires in its use in public law is readily derived from its literary usage.

Caesar calls the award of *amicitia* to Ariovistus a *beneficium* (i. 35. 2) and has the same term for his personal favors to Ambiorix (v. 27. 2) and to Commius (vii. 76. 2). When Caesar sends the revolted Aeduans back to their homes, he adds "*suo beneficio conservatos quos iure belli interficere potuisset*" (vii. 41. 1). That is practically the primary form of a *beneficium*, an act redounding to the advantage of the *beneficiarius* which that *beneficiarius* could not have claimed as of right. Consequently in the case of an accepted *deditio*, anything done for the *dediticii*, beyond sparing their lives and their personal freedom, is a *beneficium*. When Convictolitavis grudgingly refers to the award in his favor as *nonnullum beneficium* (vii. 37. 4), he hastily qualifies it by asserting that he had obtained no more than a *iustissima causa*, i.e., no real *beneficium* at all. It is only in the general or literary sense that such an award could be so denominated, just as the advantages derived from Vercingetorix' leadership are also called *beneficia* (vii. 20. 12).

The *officia* referred to in the course of Caesar's narrative are the mutual duties that nations have toward each other either because of treaty, as in the case of the Aeduans, or by reason of *deditio* (v. 4. 2). They are practically all those obligations imposed by the *fides* existing in the cases mentioned. As a matter of fact, *in fide manere* (vii. 10. 3) is used in the same sense as *in officio manere*

(vi. 4. 2). And again the *vetus ac perpetua fides* of the Aeduans is different from the *recentibus belli Gallici officiis* of the Remi only in point of time (v. 54. 4).

Otherwise the word is used, as in the case of Cotta (v. 33. 2), or as representing the gratitude Ambiorix owes his benefactor (v. 27. 7), in the ordinary sense of "duty."

In concluding this examination of the international law that Caesar consciously and unconsciously followed in the campaigns in Gaul, it may not be without interest to compare a still more ancient manual which is doubtless as much a record of actual practice as Caesar's account is. In Deut. 20:10 ff., we read the following: "When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege it. And when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword."

We have only to remember the case of the Aduatuci (ii. 32) to note a striking parallel between the situation in the mind of the biblical writer and the actual practice of Caesar: "Ad haec Caesar respondit: Se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum civitatem conservaturum: si prius quam murum aries attigisset, se dedidissent."

But a still more striking example is an incident of the very first campaign of Caesar. The Helvetians, we remember, sent ambassadors to Caesar (i. 7. 3) "qui dicerent sibi esse in animo sine ullo maleficio iter per provinciam facere, propterea quod aliud iter haberent nullum; rogare ut eius voluntate id sibi facere liceat." It is exactly the same situation that we read of in Num. 20:14 ff. "And Moses sent messengers from Kadesh unto the king of Edom, Thus saith thy brother Israel, Thou knowest all the travail that hath befallen us . . . behold, we are in Kadesh, a city in the uttermost of thy border. Let us pass, I pray thee, through thy country: we will not pass through the fields or through the vineyards, neither will we drink of the water of the wells: we will go

by the king's highway; we will not turn to the right hand nor to the left, until we have passed thy border. And Edom said unto him, Thou shalt not pass by me, lest I come out against thee with the sword. And the children of Israel said unto him, We will go up by the highway; and if I and my cattle drink of thy water, then I will pay for it: I will only, without doing anything else, go through on my feet."

In both cases permission was refused. Just as Edom threatens to come out with a sword, so Caesar says, "*si vim facere conentur, prohibiturum.*" But alike as the incidents are, there is also a curious and instructive contrast between them. The Helvetians failed and it is Caesar's account alone that has survived. Israel succeeded and it is the Israelitish account that we have. If the dream of Orgetorix had been realized, who knows but that the Romans would have been known to us only as a churlish Edom, deservedly punished for their unreasonable perversity?

ELISION AND HIATUS IN LATIN PROSE AND VERSE¹

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I

It has come to be familiar doctrine that the elision which we have to observe in reading Latin verse really belonged as well to the pronunciation of prose. Aside from the very great probability that so striking and so common a feature of Latin poetry was not wholly artificial, there are four chief reasons for the current opinion. In the first place, elision is most common in precisely that kind of poetry which approaches most nearly the language of everyday life, namely comedy; Plautus has over 150 elisions or semi-elisions to 100 lines, while Ennius, his contemporary, has only 22 elisions to 100 lines. In the second place, the students of rhythmic prose are agreed that elision must usually if not always be assumed in the clausulae. In the third place, there are passages in ancient authors where elision in prose is spoken of in terms that cannot be misunderstood. Several of these will be discussed below. In the fourth place, elision is seen in a considerable number of stereotyped phrases, such as *animadverto* for *animum adverto*, *antea* for *ante ea*, *circitor* for *circum itor*, *curago* for *curam ago*, *eccos* for *ecce*, *hos eccillum* for *ecce illum*, *magnopere* for *magno opere*, *necopinans* for *neque opinans*, *nullus* for *ne ullus*, *potest* for *pote est*, *reapse* for *re capse*, *sodes* for *si audes*, and *veneo* for *venum eo*. These phrases are of particular interest since they are colloquial. Elision was a feature not only of artistic prose but of everyday speech as well.

Nevertheless it does not follow that elision was as nearly universal in prose as it was in poetry. In fact some peculiarities of elision in poetry obviously cannot reflect the usage of ordinary conversation. The poets not infrequently present elision at the

¹ This is an abstract of a paper by Professor Sturtevant and Professor R. G. Kent of the University of Pennsylvania, in *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, XLVI. Professor Sturtevant is primarily responsible for I, II, and III, and Professor Kent for IV; but both authors contributed to numerous paragraphs.

end of a sentence; but it would be quite absurd to ascribe this practice to common speech as well. The dramatic poets very often present elision at a change of speakers, but we cannot suppose that in real life a Roman could foresee the reply to his question so as to treat his final vowel in one way if the reply was to begin with a vowel and in a very different way if the reply was to begin with a consonant.

Our feeling that elision cannot have been usual in prose at a strong pause in the sense is strengthened when we remember that even the poets occasionally admit hiatus in such a position. A still stronger argument is furnished by the almost universal preference of hiatus to elision at the close of a verse; for, as far as form is concerned, the verse is to poetry what the sentence is to prose. Hiatus is further permitted at the main caesura or diaeresis in most types of verse, and this would seem to indicate that elision did not occur in prose at minor pauses. Since the direct evidence on prose usage which we considered above applies only to concurrent vowels within a phrase, there is no way to determine just how strong the pause had to be in order to prevent elision. In the lack of precise evidence we may suppose that elision in Latin prose was restricted approximately to phrases as closely united as those which in modern French present liaison of consonants.

Even within the phrase we must not assume that elision was as nearly constant in prose as it was in verse. Hiatus within the phrase is clearly recognized by Quintilian (ix. 4. 33-37). After warning the orator against too frequent *vocalium concursus*, he continues (36): "At Demonthenes et Cicero modice respexerunt ad hanc partem. Nam et coeuntes litterae, quae *συναλοιφαί* dicuntur, etiam leviores faciunt orationem, quam si omnia verba suo fine cluduntur; et nonnunquam hiulca etiam decent faciuntque ampliora quaedam, ut *pulchra oratione acta*. Tum longae per se et velut opimae syllabae aliquid etiam medii temporis inter vocales, quasi intersistatur, assumunt."² Here the contrast of hiatus with

² "But Demonthenes and Cicero paid only moderate attention to this matter. For the union of letters which people call synalepha makes speech even smoother than it is if every word comes to a close at its own end; and sometimes hiatus is suitable and it gives an added impressiveness to certain phrases, as, for example, *pulchra oratione acta*. In this case syllables which in themselves are long and, as it were, fat have added to them an interval of time between the vowels as if there were a pause."

synalepha is illustrated by the phrase *pulchra oratione acta*, and the last sentence makes it clear that the final vowel of *pulchra* and the initial vowel of *oratione* were both pronounced with their full quantity and with a slight pause between them.

The parallel passage in Cicero (*Orator* 150-52) is so much less clear that it would be difficult to understand without the commentary furnished by Quintilian. Only one of Cicero's remarks, however, seems inconsistent with the later author. After speaking of hiatus in certain Greek writers, he says (152): "Sed Graeci viderint; nobis ne si cupiamus quidem distrahere voces conceditur."¹ In view of Quintilian's statement that hiatus was proper in the phrase *pulchra oratione acta* this must mean that <under certain conditions or in certain types of phrases> the separation of successive words was impossible in Latin although possible in Greek.

It is not surprising, then, to observe that the stereotyped phrases show hiatus in a number of instances. *Circumagi* and *circum eo* are quadrisyllabic in poetry, and such spellings as *circuit*, *circuire*, and *circuitus* are common. Although *quemadmodum* regularly shows elision in the poets, a fuller pronunciation is indicated by epigraphic *queadmodum*. *Neuter* is regularly a trisyllable, and *nihil* and *nihilum* both retain the final vowel of the first word. *Nemo*, *deinde*, *deinceps*, *proinde*, *prout*, *quoad*, and *quousque* all show hiatus either with or without subsequent contraction.

The evidence does not enable us to decide under precisely what circumstances elision within the phrase took place. We may surmise that elision was more frequent in rapid utterance than in deliberate speech, and Quintilian tells us that hiatus was sometimes preferred for the sake of emphasis. It is likely that considerations of rhythm had some bearing upon the question. It might be supposed, furthermore, that some combinations of vowels would be more prone to elision than others, and the stereotyped phrases *proinde*, *prout*, *quoad*, and *quousque* may indicate that long *o* tended to remain before a dissimilar vowel. That we cannot apply here the rules for contraction or hiatus in the interior of a word is shown by the different results of elision and contraction.

¹ "But let the Greeks consider that matter; for us it is not allowable to separate our words even if we would."

II

Recent publications on Latin grammar are almost as unanimous in regard to the character of elision as in regard to its prevalence in prose as well as in verse. Elided vowels, it is assumed, were not entirely suppressed, but were merely so far reduced that they occupied no appreciable time. The chief basis for this opinion seems to be a widespread conviction that the total suppression of elided vowels would obscure the meaning. In particular, many scholars rebel against the traditional "total elision" in early dramatic verse of such words as *i* "they," *i* "go," and the deictic particle *em*. There is, however, an easy alternative in the semi-elision or prosodic hiatus which all scholars assume in such phrases as *quī āmānt*, *cūm ēō*, etc. Perhaps some may hesitate to push this method of reading as far as Lindsay does, who says (*The Captivi of Plautus* 49): "Perhaps the best plan to follow will be to suppose prosodic hiatus where there would be any stress on the word;" but surely all will prefer to read, for example, *i in malām crucēm* rather than (*i*) *in malām crucēm* with elision. Even if we assume that an elided *i* was still audible, it is unsatisfactory to transfer the verse ictus from the imperative to the unemphatic preposition. It is quite unlikely that monosyllables consisting wholly of a vowel or of a vowel followed by *m* ever suffered elision. We are convinced that after other monosyllables also semi-elision was more common in early dramatic verse than many scholars yet recognize. In later poetry this feature is less prominent, but the elision of monosyllables is largely avoided by other means. It may be that a diligent search would discover a few passages which would really be made ambiguous by the complete loss of elided vowels; for every language tolerates occasional ambiguity. We do not know of any such passage.

In any case there is reason for thinking that the Romans must have been able to dispense with some of their abundant inflectional tags. In all languages the hearer, as a rule, receives through the ear only a part of the sounds produced by the speaker, and supplies the rest of them from his knowledge of the situation and of the language spoken. It is for this reason that we understand a sentence more readily than we do a list of unrelated words or

an unfamiliar name. Since Latin inflectional syllables were nearly all of them unaccented they must have been among the most difficult speech-sounds to hear, and we are thus driven to one of these two conclusions: either the Romans spoke with more precision and distinctness than any modern people, or else Latin could be understood even though some of the inflectional syllables failed to be heard. Besides, the retention of "minimal" final vowels before initial vowels would certainly not help much in the understanding of the language. If full syllables frequently fail to reach the ear, certainly there would be small likelihood that an auditor in the last row could distinguish a vowel which the actor spoke so rapidly that it had no metrical value whatever.

That as a matter of fact elided vowels were completely lost is shown by the following four considerations:

1. The assumption of a mere reduction of elided vowels leads to impossible conclusions. If we suppose that such vowels became semivowels they should make position. In Vergil *Georg.* ii. 180:

Tenuis ubi argilla et dumosis calculus arvis

the first syllable of *tenuis* is long because the *u* is here treated as a semivowel, but the first syllable of *ubi* cannot be treated in the same way. It must remain short although the *i* of the following syllable is elided.

The alternative theory that elided vowels were still heard as vowels, but were spoken so rapidly that they had no metrical value, becomes absurd when it is applied to certain lines of Plautus (e.g., *Bacch.* 1162), which have no less than three cases of elision within a single proceleusmatic. It must be remembered that the proceleusmatic is an irrational foot to start with; that is, its four syllables have to be spoken in the time of three. Will anyone maintain that an actor could pronounce four full syllables and three reduced syllables in the time normally occupied by three short syllables without making himself ridiculous?

2. Plautus puns on *cum catello ut accubes* and *cum catella ut accubes*. Plautine puns, it is true, are not a very safe basis for phonetic argument; but this particular pun would be quite pointless if the final vowel of *catello* could be distinguished.

3. The evidence of the stereotyped phrases seems quite conclusive. Such forms as *antea*, *eccos*, *nullus*, *magnopere*, and *sodes* presuppose the complete loss of the final vowel of the first word. The phrases *animadverto*, *circitor*, *curago*, and *veneo* are equally good proof that final *am* and *um* might be completely lost before an initial vowel belonging to the same phrase.

4. The ancient grammarians and metricians quite clearly prescribe the suppression of elided vowels. As typical treatments of the matter we may cite the following.

Marius Plotius Sacerdos vi. 448 K.: "De synalifa. Synalifa est quando finita pars orationis in vocalem vel in *m* litteram vel in *s*, altera parte orationis incipiente a vocali, eliditur, ut *mene efferre pedem* et *mene incepto*. Sic in vocali. In *m* littera *m* non sola perit in metro sed etiam vocalis quae eam antecedit ut *monstrum horrendum ingens*."¹ Here the verb *perit* cannot denote anything short of complete loss.

Charisius i. 279 K.: "Episynaliphe est una syllaba ex duabus syllabis facta, ut

Fixerit aeripedem cervam licet,

cum *aeripedem* quinque syllabis dicere debeamus. Synaliphe est duorum vocalium concursu alterius elisio, ut

Atque ea diversa penitus dum parte geruntur.

e litteram hinc necesse est excludi."²

Many other passages quite as explicit as these might be cited from the grammarians of the fourth and later centuries; and we must assume, in the absence of conflicting evidence, that the unanimous opinion of the late grammarians represents a tradition from classical times.

¹ "Synalepha occurs when a word ending in a vowel or *m* or *s* is elided before a following word which begins with a vowel, e.g., *mene efferre pedem* and *mene incepto*. Thus in the case of a vowel. In the case of *m* not only is *m* lost in the meter but also the vowel which precedes it, e.g., *monstrum horrendum ingens*."

² "Episynalepha is the formation of one syllable from two, e.g.,

Fixerit aeripedem cervam licet,

although we should pronounce *aeripedem* in five syllables. Synalepha is the elision of one of two concurrent vowels, e.g.,

Atque ea diversa penitus dum parte geruntur.

Here an *e* must be crowded out."

Fortunately, however, we are not left to a mere inference. Quintilian, in the passage cited above (ix. 4. 36), says: "Nam coeuntes litterae, quae συναλοιφαὶ dicuntur, etiam leviozem faciunt orationem, quam si omnia verba suo fine cluduntur." If a word whose final vowel was elided did not come to a close at its own end, the vowel must have been completely lost; for the pronunciation *ill(e) et* (i.e., *illet*) pretty effectually obscures the word-end, while *ill' et* with a "minimal vowel" would retain a syllable division at the end of the first word.

III

In the case of final *m* before an initial vowel Quintilian seems not to recognize elision, but only the pronunciation which we have found to be indicated by *circuire*, *queadmodum*, *cura ago*, etc. He discusses the matter as follows (ix. 4. 46): "Quotiens < *m* littera > ultima est et vocalem verbi sequentis ita contingit, ut in eam transire possit, etiamsi scribitur, tamen parum exprimitur, ut *multum ille* et *quantum erat*; adeo ut paene cuiusdam novae litterae sonum reddat. Neque enim eximitur sed obscuratur et tantum aliqua inter duas vocales velut nota est, ne ipsae coeant." This passage must be interpreted in the light of some other ancient statements about final *m* before an initial vowel. Velius Longus says (vii. 54 K.): "Cum dicitur *illum ego* et *omnium optimum*, *illum* et *omnium* aequae *m* terminat, nec tamen in enuntiatione apparet."¹ More important, in view of its date, is a remark which Velius Longus quotes (vii. 80 K.) from Verrius Flaccus, the famous schoolmaster of the Augustan age: "Non nulli circa syneliphas quoque observandum talem scriptionem existimaverunt, sicut Verrius Flaccus, ut ubicumque prima vox *m* littera finiretur, sequens a vocali inciperet, *m* non tota, sed pars illius prior tantum scriberetur, ut appareret expirimi non debere."² The last four words amount to an explicit statement that *m* in such a position was not pronounced. Quin-

¹ "When one says *illum ego* and *omnium optimum*, *m* is the final letter of *illum* and *omnium*, but nevertheless it does not appear in pronunciation."

² "Some, e.g., Verrius Flaccus, have thought that a similar method of writing should be followed in case of synalepha also, so that in case the first word ended in *m* and the second began with a vowel the entire letter *m* should not be written but only the first part of it, to make it clear that the letter should not be pronounced."

tilian's remark can be squared with this only on the supposition that Quintilian fails to discriminate clearly between pronunciation and spelling—a failing of which many good scholars both ancient and modern have been guilty. We therefore interpret the Quintilian passage thus: “Whenever <*m*> is final and is so closely combined <by the sense of the passage> with the <initial> vowel of the following word that it can run over, <i.e., be absorbed> into the latter, it is written, to be sure, but scarcely pronounced, as in *multum ille* and *quantum erat*; and so we may almost say that it indicates the sound of a new letter, <i.e., it does not represent the sound of *m*>. For *m* is not taken out <from the written text>, but is suppressed and is merely a sort of mark between the two vowels to prevent their combining <by synalepha>.”

The last two words of this interpretation are justified by Quintilian's definition of *coeuntes litterae* in section 36 (quoted above) and by a remark which occurs in xi. 3. 34: “Nam et vocales frequentissimi coeunt, et consonantium quaedam insequente vocali dissimulatur. Utriusque exemplum posuimus *multum ille et terris*. . . .”¹ A comparison of these three passages seems to show that in Quintilian's opinion, while an elided vowel was completely lost, a vowel which became final on the loss of final *m* was pronounced. As we have seen, evidence furnished by the stereotyped phrases is opposed to such a distinction; for some phrases which have lost a final *m* of the first word show complete elision while others retain a vowel in hiatus, and the same variety of behavior is found in the phrases with an original final vowel. There are, furthermore, no metrical phenomena which favor such a distinction as Quintilian seems to make; in fact classical poetry avoids hiatus after *m* more carefully than after a vowel.

It seems probable, then, that while final *m* was regularly lost before an initial vowel in the same phrase, the vowel before the *m* was sometimes retained and sometimes lost. Quintilian preferred to retain it in all cases, at least when speaking in public, and he

¹ “For vowels very often run together, and one of the consonants disappears when a vowel follows. An example of both processes has been given in *multum ille et terris*.”

used the same pronunciation in verse. Such a practice must have interfered with the regularity of the meter, especially when a foot of too many syllables resulted, as would be the case in *Aeneid* iii. 643:

Centu(m) alii curva haec habitant ad litora vulgo,

or where the following syllable was already extra heavy on account of containing a long vowel or diphthong followed by two consonants, as in *Aeneid* iii. 714:

Hic labor extremus, longaru(m) haec meta viarum.

Probably Quintilian was the sort of person who would read English blank verse as if it were prose.

Another schoolmaster who seems to have read verse in the same way was Probus, if we may judge from Gellius' quotation (13. 21. 6) of a statement of his that *turrim* in (*Aeneid* 2. 460) had a more pleasant sound than *turrem* in.

IV

Some statements of the handbooks about the occurrence of elision require correction. It has been impossible to examine the whole field of Latin poetry, but a study of representative dactylic and elegiac poets and of Plautus and Terence yields the following results.

Elision is most frequent in Plautus and Terence, who have more than 150 instances per 100 lines. Next to these comes Lucilius with 133 per cent (if we may use this expression for "per 100 lines"). Ennius, however, has only 22 per cent. The hexameters of the Ciceronian period and the time of the second Triumvirate (Lucretius, Catullus, Horace's *Satires*, Vergil's earlier poems) show about 45 per cent. About 30 B.C. there must have been a sudden reaction against the excessive use of elision; for in Tibullus, Propertius, Horace's *Epistles*, and Ovid we find but 14 per cent to 24 per cent. Of particular interest is the contrast between Horace's earlier and later usage; the two books of *Satires* show 43 per cent and 46 per cent respectively, while the two books of *Epistles* show only 19 per cent and 20 per cent. Vergil, however, was not affected by the new fashion; his percentages, as far as our investigations have gone, show a steady rise from 28 per cent in the first six *Eclogues* to 56 per cent in the last book of the *Aeneid*. Silver Latin shows great

variety in the frequency of elision, but most of the poems examined fall between the 45 per cent of the Ciceronian period and 20 per cent, which may be taken as the norm for Augustan poets except Vergil. Some few imperial writers of hexameters (Calpurnius Siculus, Martial, Nemesianus, Claudianus) avoid elision almost entirely.

Elegiac poetry shows a similar history. From Catullus' 60 per cent and 62 per cent in hexameter and pentameter respectively there is a sudden drop to 14 per cent and 12 per cent in Tibullus, 24 per cent and 19 per cent in Propertius, and about 18 per cent and 10 per cent in Ovid.

It is often stated that long vowels suffer elision but rarely before a short. We find, on the contrary, that more than four-fifths of all elided long vowels and diphthongs stand before short vowels! Since only about one-fourteenth of them stand before short vowels in open syllables, it would be quite correct to say that long vowels suffer elision but rarely before short syllables. There is, however, no great difference between the treatment of long and short vowels, and so a less misleading statement would be that elision is most frequent before short vowels of syllables long by position.

V

Our conclusions then are these:

- a) In Latin prose, elision occurred only within the limits of a phrase, and not always there.
- b) In case of elision, there was complete loss of the final vowel or of final *m* and the vowel before it. This method of pronunciation came to be the regular one in poetry, although hiatus was never fully banished from verse.
- c) In the first century A.D., certain scholars preferred hiatus in all cases where a final *m* was lost before a vowel; but the technique of the poets took no account of this fad.
- d) Elision in Latin verse decreased suddenly and violently about 30 B.C., but increased again in most of the Silver Poets, and declined again still later to a very low point.
- e) Most elision occurs before short initial vowels of syllables long by position.

ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF KATHARSIS AND THE POSITIVE OR CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY INVOLVED

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I

Aristotle's doctrine of katharsis is set forth in his definition of tragedy. Tragedy, according to that definition, is "an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action; not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions."¹

Of this doctrine of katharsis or purgation itself I have no new interpretation to offer. Nor do I aim to supersede the translators or the critics. The interpretation given this passage by the best of them is evidently correct and to be relied upon. It is the doctrine itself that is inadequate. It is inadequate, at least, as a statement or description of that inner experience through which in part, as Aristotle implies, we come to know what the nature of tragedy is. For, in gaining in this way what we know of the nature of tragedy, we are more dependent upon a positive and constructive activity than upon the negative process which Aristotle calls katharsis or purgation.

To understand more precisely what is involved in Aristotle's doctrine of katharsis it is necessary first to review briefly two points in the text. Both points are contained in that part of the definition which reads: δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαινουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν, and which Butcher translates: "through pity

¹ S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, New York, 1898, 2d ed., p. 23.

and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions." One point concerns the word *κάθαρσις*; the other concerns the genitive expression *τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων*, which depends upon it.

With regard to the genitive, most critics are agreed that the feelings referred to in the expressions *τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων* and *δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου* are not identical. Both expressions refer to pity and fear; but the pity and fear in the one case differ from the pity and fear in the other. The *ἐλέος* and *φόβος* are quite evidently, according to Aristotle's definition, the *aesthetic* emotions of pity and fear—the form of these emotions that is awakened or aroused by "the tragic representation"; whereas the feelings referred to in the expression *τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων* are "the emotions of pity and fear *which belong to real life*."¹

Even with this important distinction before us a second difficulty in this first point confronts us. For the genitive expression itself is open to at least two distinct interpretations. Under one interpretation the phrase means, as Ueberweg takes it, "not a purification of the emotions, but a (temporary) emancipation of the individual from their influence . . . a temporary relief, to be obtained through their very excitation (by artificial means) and subsequent subsidence. . . . the emotions excited in us are (again) quieted by their very exhaustion, are in a sense purged out of us (*καθαίρεται*); but although it is only the emotions immediately excited by the given work of art which are thus affected directly, yet indirectly *all other similar emotions* . . . are similarly purged away; we are *temporarily freed (or 'cleansed')* from all of them."² But, according to Butcher, this is not the correct interpretation. *τῶν τοιούτων* does not mean "all such emotions," or "these and suchlike emotions," but, by a frequent and idiomatic use, "the aforesaid emotions," namely, pity and fear. The expression means, then, not that there is effected an actual temporary discharge and

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 236, footnote. The italics are mine.

² *History of Philosophy*, I, 178–79 (italics mine). This may be called the cynical view; but there is much in Greek literature to support it. The emotions themselves were thought bad. Cf. Plato *Phaedo* 69 C, *κάθαρσις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων* [*sc.* *τῶν ἡδονῶν*], "the purging away of these pleasures—" i.e., a deliverance of the soul from lusts. In this passage the medical sense of *κάθαρσις* shades off into the religious sense. Sometimes it shades off into a moral sense.

removal of the emotions of pity and fear, but rather the purgation or purification of the pity and fear of real life through the awakening of the aesthetic emotions of pity and fear. "The feelings of pity and fear in real life," he says, in stating his view, "contain a morbid and disturbing element. In the process of tragic excitation they find relief, and the morbid element is thrown off. . . . The painful element in the pity and fear of reality is purged away; the emotions themselves are purged."¹ The expulsion of a painful and disquieting element is effected. Or, as he has rephrased it elsewhere: "Pity and fear, artificially stirred, expel the latent pity and fear which we bring with us from real life, or at least such elements in them as are disquieting."² This seems the more satisfactory interpretation.

This interpretation of the genitive expression carries with it the general explanation of the second point, namely, *katharsis*. For, if the interpretation is correct, it is precisely in the elimination of the morbid, painful, disquieting, and disturbing element in the pity and fear of real life through the arousing of the aesthetic form of these emotions that what Aristotle calls *katharsis* takes place. This is *katharsis*. *τὴν κάθαρσιν* are his words; and Butcher translates: "the proper purgation." He might have translated, "the well-known"; for the homeopathic treatment of *ἐνθουσιασμός* or spiritual emotionalism by a kind of wild and restless music was familiar to the Greeks; and it was, evidently, the immediate source of suggestion to Aristotle for this part of his theory of tragedy. To make clear what he meant by this kind of homeopathic treatment through tragedy, Aristotle used a novel metaphor drawn from medicine. He may have done so even consciously. His father, Nichomachus, was a physician. The theory was new. The metaphor was as apt as it was illuminating. The expression is natural enough. According to Bernays, then, whom Butcher fol-

¹ Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 249. Nothing strikes more directly to the heart of one's efficiency in life than pity, especially self-pity, and fear. Economically regarded—and we may well so regard it—the drama, and especially tragedy, is one of the most highly effective means of maintaining at normal efficiency in life the individual members of that society out of which the drama springs. Something of this Aristotle evidently recognized.

² *Ibid.*, p. 242.

lows on this point, katharsis "denotes a pathological effect on the soul analogous to the effect of medicine on the body. . . . Tragedy excites the emotions of pity and fear—kindred emotions that are in the breasts of all men—and by the act of excitation affords a pleasurable relief."¹ Katharsis, as a form or type of inner experience through which in part we come to know the nature of tragedy, means the purification, through the aesthetic awakening of pity and fear, of the morbid, painful, disquieting element that belongs to these emotions as we know them in real or everyday life.

With this explanation of katharsis and a satisfactory interpretation of the genitive expression before us, the latter part of Aristotle's definition becomes clearer. We may translate somewhat freely as follows: Tragedy effects, through pity and fear, as these emotions are awakened by tragic representation, the proper or well-known katharsis or purification of the emotions of pity and fear as we know them in real life; that is, the morbid, painful, disquieting element in this form of these emotions is purged away or thrown off.

This general exposition helps us understand Aristotle's doctrine of katharsis. But if this exposition is correct, and if Aristotle's purpose in the latter part of his definition may fairly be said to be an attempt to represent, as far as inner experience can reveal, the essential nature of tragedy, it would seem that the possibilities of analysis have nowhere been carried to their logical and psychological conclusions. For both Aristotle and his chief interpreters leave the question with its negative side uppermost. Unduly attracted, perhaps, by the novel and striking form of his metaphor, Aristotle emphasized the negative aspect merely of a total activity; his interpreters, overabsorbed, it may be, in controversies about nice points of interpretation, have failed to see what more is involved. True, Aristotle suggests by his phrase δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου, "through pity and fear," a recognition of some process or activity that is positive rather than negative. But he goes no farther. He deals more with the *result* of some implied process than he does with the process itself. The final emphasis is not upon pity and fear as *aesthetic* emotions (his proper subject), but rather upon pity and

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 240-41.

fear as we know these emotions in real life. In truth, Aristotle has thrown the emphasis in his definition upon a form or type of pity and fear which, strictly speaking, constitutes no direct part of the aesthetic realization of what tragedy is. Butcher, too, implies some recognition of a positive or constructive activity. "The spectator," he says in one passage, "is lifted out of himself. He becomes one with the tragic sufferer, and through him with humanity at large . . . he passes out of himself. . . . He quits the narrow sphere of the individual."¹ But even here Butcher is speaking, not of any general activity or process, but of tragic fear alone. And he is led to his conclusion, not, it would seem, through the direct recognition of some positive activity involved, but by an analysis of tragic fear itself, which, as he says, is "based on an imaginative union with another's life." Not only Aristotle but Butcher, his ablest interpreter, have failed to bring out clearly that there is a positive or constructive process or activity involved in our aesthetic realization of what tragedy is, and that this process or activity must come into play before katharsis, or the purification of pity and fear, as we know these emotions in real life, can be effected.

My suggestion, then, is this: So far as we know through inner experience what the essential nature of tragedy is, we know it, not through katharsis, but primarily through a positive or constructive activity. The distinctive function of this activity is to build up, on the basis of a character represented in the drama as failing, a corresponding ideal and successful character. To judge an act as unwise or evil is necessarily to have a standard in accordance with which the judgment is made. Failure and tragedy are inconceivable without an implied background of success and happiness. Evil or failing characters, artistically presented, call forth a series of standards in terms of which these characters are said to be evil or to have failed: "On the earth the broken arcs; in the heaven a perfect round." Katharsis, however, does take place. Aristotle is not wrong. The emotions of pity and fear as we know them in real life are purified of their morbid, painful, disquieting element. But this katharsis or purification is secondary or incidental to the main activity or process. The primary and essential part of the activity or process is positive, not negative.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 261.

II

Consider *Hamlet*. When one reads or sees *Hamlet*, he does at least two things: he sets up unconsciously a series of standards according to which he judges the shortcomings and failures of Hamlet; and he groups and unifies these standards, in the same unconscious way, into a conception of an ideal and successful Hamlet.

And first, the setting up of the standards. When, for example, Hamlet spends his time making the shallow and egotistical old Polonius appear ridiculous, winds the sycophants, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, into confusion, takes up with players, while still "this thing's to do"; when, later, Hamlet the gentleman falls a-cursing like a very drab, uses coarse language to Ophelia, and rails against his mother; whenever, indeed, any expression of Hamlet's action, thought, or feeling calls forth the condemnation of reader or spectator, a standard according to which that judgment is made is, however unconsciously, necessarily set up.

The reader or spectator is not subjected, however, to the strain of making all his judgments himself. Shakespeare aids him. Throughout the play Shakespeare implies and suggests the more essential standards by which Hamlet should be judged. And he does this with such artistic subtlety and skill as not only to leave the reader or spectator unconscious of what he is being led to do, but to make him glow with delight in the belief that he is doing it himself. If, absorbed in Hamlet's hatred of insincerity and sham, and in the cleverness with which Polonius is made ridiculous or the purposes of the new-found spies, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, are laid bare, the reader or spectator temporarily loses his true moral perspective of Hamlet's character,¹ he can scarcely fail to regain it as he hears Hamlet, out of his own mouth, condemn himself for trifling with his acknowledged life-purpose:

O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I!
Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit
That from her working all his visage wann'd;
. . . . What would he do,
Had he the motive and the cue for passion
That I have?²

¹ This is precisely what the average theater-goer does.

³ II, ü, 576 f.

For another kind of judgment the reader or spectator gets his cue from the words addressed by Hamlet himself to his friend Horatio:

. thou hast been
As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing;
A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
Hast ta'en with equal thanks.¹

There is really no other artistic justification for these words; for one realizes at once that, improbable as all this is for Horatio, it represents precisely what Hamlet himself had not, but should have, done. Or again, at the close of the play, when Fortinbras, the man of practical achievement, says of Hamlet:

For he was likely, had he been put on,
To have prov'd most royally,²

a judgment is made which is probably corrective of the one set up by the pathetic story of Hamlet's indecision and inaction. All such speeches—even entire characters, Horatio and Fortinbras, for example—are finally justifiable as organic parts of the play, in that they are but subtle means to keep the standards of reader or spectator within the channels of proper artistic judgment. Aided in this way by the artist, thrilled with the joyous illusion that he himself is doing it, the reader or spectator sets up a series of standards according to which, now in thought, now in feeling, now in action, he judges Hamlet to have made but partial achievement or to have failed.

The reader or spectator does something more than set up a series of disconnected standards. He unifies these standards. Synchronously with his setting up of standards, and directly as a result of his doing so, he builds up in imagination a conception of an ideal and successful character. Stimulated by the representations of Hamlet's evident failures, skilfully guided by the poet, each reader or spectator builds up for himself³ in imagination an ideal

¹ III, ii, 70 f.

² V, ii, 408 f.

³ For this reason alone there can be no final interpretation of *Hamlet*. Each man's Hamlet is after all but a reflection of his own ideal and potential self. Necessarily so. For since the standards are his, and can be only his, the total conception of character can be nothing else but his own reflected self. Where the ultimate ideals are indefinite or open to varied construction, as in *Hamlet*, the interpretations will vary widely. Often they will be contradictory.

character, as successful as he is happy, which is the complement of the one he sees before him or finds in the pages of his text. It was this ideal, successful, and happy character the artist really had in mind as he wrote. This was the artistic conception in terms of which he portrayed his tragedy. It is part of the powerful illusion of poetry that while reader and spectator think they are but following the portrayal of a tragic character, they are being led to conceive and to construct a complementary character which, though it is individual, is also a part of universal humanity.

The conception of character formed necessarily varies; in this play, to an unusual degree. The Hamlet conceived by the boy who merely gets the story, thinking of the young prince who might have escaped death and gained the throne, is surpassed by that of the man, even of prosaic experience, who conceives of the ideal Hamlet as one exacting blood-revenge; this Hamlet, again, is surpassed by the man of larger sweep of vision who sees the ideal Hamlet, through lofty effort and vigorous action, proving himself "most royally." According to his range of experience, his insight, his aptitude, each genuine reader or spectator, aided by the artist, unconsciously builds up in imagination a conception of an ideal and successful character corresponding almost point for point to the failing one before him. The one is the tragic Hamlet—a character yielding, breaking, disintegrating, dying; the other is the complementary form—a striving, achieving, living, and perfectly unified character. Typical situations, relating in turn to the different sides of Hamlet's nature, physical, moral, social, political, aesthetic, and religious,¹ have been set forth by the artist to stimulate this constructive activity. Under the poet's inviting and powerful illusion the reader or spectator groups and unifies into a single personality practically all the best standards of character and conduct he has come to know. But because he has been drawn out of himself, because his eye has been fixed "most constantly" on Hamlet, he

¹ For example, the aesthetic decline of Hamlet is typified in the famous closet scene (III, iv). So far is the departure from the gentlemanly Hamlet of the early part of the play that Stevenson thought Shakespeare failed here. This was the author's lost battle (see his essay *Some Gentlemen in Fiction*). So in religion Hamlet passes from a state of belief in the freedom and power of the will (cf. I, v, 190-91) to a belief in pure fatalism (cf. V, ii, 10-11).

has not thought of himself; he has not even suspected what it is that the poet has so skilfully led him to do. The Hamlet truly known by poet and by reader or spectator alike is not the tragic Hamlet, not the failing Hamlet, but a positive, consistently unified, ideal, and successful Hamlet, one in whom, indeed, the tragic character can alone find artistic justification.

III

Hamlet is relatively a modern play. A positive or constructive activity is undoubtedly involved in the katharsis effected by this type of play; but against it, as a conclusive illustration, the charge of modernity might not unfairly be maintained. The keystone of Shakespeare's moral arch is the freedom of the will and individual moral responsibility. Character and passion practically determine destiny; a man's fate is his own character. Shakespeare does not disregard the formative influence and the shaping power of an outside force, whatever it may be called; but he does not make it determinative. Such conceptions were not acceptable to the Greeks. Greek drama, though far from disregarding the shaping and determining power of character, leans the other way. It is more fateful. The disaster that wrecks the life of the tragic character is due, not to deliberate choice of crime and wickedness, but to some great error or frailty. Greek drama gives the history of a deed that infringes upon the social order; it is not individualistic. It portrays a deed, committed unwittingly or with righteous intent, contrary to the social order, which goes hurtling through the world to a fatal outcome. With a fixed order behind it, does this type of play, in effecting katharsis, involve the positive and constructive process or activity?

We can be fortunate in our choice. From many indications in the *Poetics* it would appear that the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles, structurally greatest and most representative of Greek tragedy, was Aristotle's ideal play. This play and its implied conceptions seem to have been in the background of Aristotle's mind as he wrote the *Poetics*.

The story is typically Greek. By guessing her riddle, Oedipus, the great and the wise, delivers Thebes from the Sphinx. Though

an alien, he reaches the throne; he marries the widow of the late King Laius. A pestilence falls upon the city. When the Thebans ask the oracle at Delphi how they can be healed, the god Apollo bids them seek and punish the murderer of Laius, who was slain on the road to Delphi. Oedipus eagerly takes up the search. With distressing and fateful certainty it soon appears that he himself was the unwitting murderer of Laius; that he was the murdered man's son; and that, therefore, his wife is his mother.

Not then had I become
My father's murderer,
Nor wedded her I have my being from:
Whom now no God will bless,
Child of incestuousness
In her that bare me, being the spouse of her;
Yea if aught ill worse than all ill be there,
That Oedipus must bear.¹

In his agony and frenzy he puts out his own eyes.

It needs no elaboration of this story to show that the fate of Oedipus was due to no striking moral defect. That he was hasty and impulsive, that he even had a touch of proud self-assertion, is true. But these slighter defects do not constitute *ἀμαρτία*. The error of Oedipus was due to unavoidable ignorance; *ἀτύχημα*, "misfortune," is the better term, as Butcher has pointed out.² The character of Oedipus was clearly not the immediate determining factor in his destiny. He is caught in the web of an unhappy fate. For his slaying of Laius he incurs some degree of culpability. But he had provocation; possibly the deed was done in self-defense.³ His life, as Butcher says, was a chain of errors, errors for which he himself seems in nowise responsible. His marriage with his own mother, staggering in its horror to him as to us, was the culminating point of his fateful career. Yet all was done in ignorance. That he sinned unwittingly frees him from no moiety of punishment. Unjust and unfair as it may appear, it is a part of life and

¹ Ll. 1357 f.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 312.

³ *Oed. Col.* 992. Noted by Butcher.

a part of something called fate that he should lose his life in tragic waste because of the blindness, infirmity, and ignorance of human nature.

The degree to which in this play we are moved by pity and fear is probably unparalleled in Greek tragedy. Our feelings go out, yearning almost for relief, to the tragic sorrows of this fated character. As we recognize the growing fatefulness of it all, our sense of personal impotency and powerlessness deepens. Following a modern play, we usually carry with our judgment the submerged and suffused notion that, had we only the opportunity, could we but get the ear of the erring character, we might point out to him his fatal mistake, indicate another possible course of action, and so save him from tragic outcome. But before the career of Oedipus we sit back awed, staggered. Our eager minds recoil upon themselves. Our willing hands fall listless to our sides. We can do nothing.

Such a state of mind, moved by pity and fear and purified of all egotistical traces of these emotions, might seem in its very statement to deny all positive or constructive activity. It might seem that, while we do forget ourselves, we merely acquiesce in a fateful order which we are powerless to change or reconstruct. It might seem that, here at least, our doctrine was not true. But here, too, the positive or constructive activity connected with *katharsis* is involved. True, it is more sweeping and comprehensive, for it takes in, not some central tragic character alone, but the whole social order and the ultimate principles that underlie it. It is an arraignment of life itself. It may be that the principles of life and the social order are fixed and unchangeable. In the world of fact and truth at least they may be so. But in the world of imagination they are not. They are at least not necessarily so. There they may be shifted, rearranged, reorganized at man's will. There, not what *is*, and makes man unhappy and ruins his life, but what *may and ought to be* to bring him joy, is conceived and built into an ideal world. Synchronous with the dramatic presentation of the fated career of Oedipus is the imaginative construction of a world where the opposite of his character and fate is true. If it were not so, "what's a heaven for"? However untrue in fact, however

impossible of final realization in life as it is, such a world of imagination and ideals is a place of refuge, temporary but pleasing and refreshing, from the irksome, if not brutal, facts of life itself.

Here, as in the modern drama, in any rational drama, indeed, the mind will regard as true and rational only those presentations of tragic character which allow an imaginative construction of a positive, ideal, successful, and, in some measure, happy character to correspond to the tragic character of the stage or of the printed text. Pity and fear as tragic emotions are otherwise impossible. Any conception of tragedy becomes rational, becomes *conceivable* indeed, only as a background of some kind of corresponding success and happiness is constructed in imagination. Tragedy, as a form of failure, has meaning only as it implies conceivable success. Whether a play be Greek and founded upon fate, or oriental and founded upon religious ceremony, or Shakespearean and founded upon the freedom of the will, or contemporary and grounded in the doctrine of environment, matters not at all, so far as pity and fear are concerned in their relation to a positive and constructive activity. Each type quickens pity and fear. That is essential, indispensable. But to awaken pity and fear some conception of a non-tragic career is psychologically necessary. A positive or constructive activity is involved wherever there is true tragic emotion.

IV

Two points appear in conclusion. First, there is an intimate connection between what Aristotle calls *katharsis*, and a positive or constructive activity. *Katharsis* is not a separate and independent effect of tragedy. It is the negative side of a total activity, the primary function of which is to build up and construct an ideal corresponding to the tragic character. *Katharsis* cannot be produced unless this constructive activity works. Purification is the negative side of a positive achievement; and the positive achievement is more important than the purification. That is an after-effect, a by-product of imaginative achievement. Pity and fear in real life contain a morbid and disquieting element. This morbid and disquieting element in this form of these emotions is carried off through an awakening of the aesthetic form of these emotions.

Tragedy effects a change of point of view. It enables the reader or spectator to attach to the tragic character feelings previously centered in himself. To pity and fear for the tragic character means that one passes out of and beyond the pity, especially self-pity, and the fear (apprehension about success) that is touching one's own life. The emotions are the same in kind; they have changed their point of attachment. In and through changing their point of attachment the morbid and egotistical element has been sloughed off. The egotistical form of these emotions has been purified.

And secondly, it is primarily through a positive and constructive activity that we come to know, as far as inner experience is concerned, what the nature of tragedy really is. We know this through positive achievement, not primarily through a negative effect. Aristotle has dealt only with the negative aspect of a total process. He deals, strictly speaking, with a form of pity and fear that has no direct concern with our knowledge of what tragedy is. Rather, it is a condition of our knowing. What we know of the essential nature of tragedy we know through the aesthetic experience. In this experience we build up an ideal and successful character, corresponding to the tragic character; and in the moment of our joy we *become* that character. Katharsis, or the purification of the pity and fear of everyday life, is not directly a part of the aesthetic experience at all. It is a condition of its consummation. What we know of the nature of tragedy depends less upon a negative than upon a positive and constructive activity.

THE EARLY DAYS OF BALLET: A COMPARISON

BY SHIRLEY SMITH
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"I am the Ballet Russe." Such, we read, are the words of M. Serge de Diaghileff.¹ Yet in the same paper a well-known musician declares, "To be 'modern' is to be older than the ancients: to be 'new,' one must have been trained by the 'old.'"²

The obvious "old," in the case of the Russian Ballet, which so recently made its first and long-anticipated appearance on our shores, is the technical training which practically all of the members have enjoyed in the Imperial School of Ballet at Petrograd. There they had the most careful instruction from early childhood as wards of the government,³ but traditional, we are told,⁴ and differing little from that given in Milan a hundred years ago. The present Diaghileff Ballet is not altogether the same that one would see in Russia, for these artists disagree with some of the principles of the "mother" school and are trying to work along broader lines.⁵ The "new" in this ballet, Russian yet not all Russian, made up of a wonderfully versatile band of reactionaries—whence did it come? Can it be that some part of its very modernness is, all unconsciously, "older than the ancients"? Who would say, as we read the history of the earliest real "drama ballet" we know, in parallel column with that of the "drama ballet" of the very last decade, that we may not find the new ballet going back, more definitely than it ever realized, to some of the principles held two thousand years ago?

¹ *Musical America*, January 29, 1916, p. 53.

² Arthur Hartmann, *ibid.*, p. 21.

³ I.e., in a school under government control and patronage. The tuition is not free, however.

⁴ Flitch, *Modern Dancing and Dancers*, p. 130.

⁵ *Musical America*, January 22, 1916, pp. 1, 2, 3; *ibid.*, January 29, p. 53; Flitch p. 130; *Boston Transcript*, January 8, 1916; *Spectator*, February, 1913.

We are wont to turn back to the Greeks as the fountain-head of beauty. Miss Isadora Duncan has tried to catch the elusive secret of the Greek dance from the vases. The Hellenic shadow-world sends back no message to let us know how near the truth she comes. Individualism, however, marks Miss Duncan's dancing. She will never represent a widespread type. The Pyrrhic dance¹ among the Greeks reminds one of a conspicuous form of the now "older" ballet dancing with its "enregimented and battalioned young ladies." As Friedländer describes it, "New groupings, involutions, and disentanglements followed one another: they formed circles, rows, disorderly masses, and squares—chiefly dances of a Bacchic or similar nature."² These dances could easily be worked into the dramatic form, and under Roman rule this was actually done.³

The pantomimic dance, where there is an actual story to tell and no mere slender thread of narrative stuff to give a semblance of unity to totally unrelated dances, is really a product of Rome, and sprang into full growth, one might almost say, early in the reign of Augustus.⁴ Because it is not classed as "literature,"⁵ the pantomime gets scant attention from the ordinary classical student. We may know the catchy phrase "Mimes and Pantomimes," and we may have compared some of the wise saws faithfully culled from the coarse pages of the Mimes with the wisdom of Solomon, but with that art which the elder Seneca called *morbum meum*,⁶ which was the main attraction⁷ of the theater for the cultivated⁸ of all ranks through five hundred years of the Roman Empire, the student in everyday work has little occasion to become acquainted.

¹ *Blackwood's Magazine*, March, 1869.

² *Sittengeschichte Roms* (tr. Freese and Magnus), II, 108.

³ Suet. *Nero* xii; Apuleius' description of such a festival in Roman Corinth (Friedländer, II, 108).

⁴ Luc. *περί ὀρχ.* 34.

⁵ Cf. Teuffel, *History of Roman Literature*, s.v. "Pantomime."

⁶ *Contr. excerpt.* iii. praef.

⁷ A "rage" for dancing; cf. Ovid *Trist.* ii. 519; Pliny *Paneg.* 54; *Ep.* vii. 24; Liban. III (Reiske), 2. l.; even private stages; e.g., Suet. *Cal.* liv.

⁸ Philostratus (Friedländer, II, 109).

Since ballet is "in the air," then, just now, it seems singularly appropriate to go back to this earliest form, to try to picture the intangible, and to see what has been the development or fate of some of the principal features in the centuries since.

One is surprised at the number and variety of the references: the very fact that so many are merely casual shows how common the performance of pantomime became. Besides, it happens that there are at least two treatises, both in Greek—that of Libanius from the fourth century and that of Lucian, the *περὶ ὀρχήσεως*, from the second. It is easy to think, perhaps, that Lucian, in endeavoring to win over his Stoic friend to a like enthusiasm for the dance, proves too much; but his work, in spite of that, gives many details to help complete the picture.

It has been often said¹ that the plays of the Romans were more like operas than like our tragedies and comedies; yet they were never pure opera, for the *Diverbia* in iambic senarians was always recited. Of the *Cantica*, or monologues to be sung, now in recitative, now with melodramatic delivery and musical accompaniment, the Romans were especially fond. At some time, too, the strange fashion started of having one actor near the flute-player sing the words,² the other make the proper gestures. The Romans never demanded "realism" on the stage, else this could never have pleased them. Pliny describes humorously³ the way poets, even, had someone else read their lines while they stood by and illustrated the action with a sort of *mimique*. As for himself, he was afraid he could do the latter no better than the former. One day the idea came of leaving out the spoken part of the play entirely, and on that day⁴ Roman pantomime had its birth. It is interesting to note that one of the best-known Russian ballets, *Prince Igor*, has been made by a similar process of "cutting" the rather tedious opera.

The important part which Pylades⁵ and Bathyllus played then, in 22 B.C., was to establish the *Cantica* as a separate form, each⁶

¹ E.g., Friedländer, II, 98; cf. Smith, *Dictionary of Classical Antiquities*, s.v. *Cantica*.

² Livy vii. 2; Luc. 30; Val. Max. ii. 4. 4.

³ Pliny *Ep.* ix. 34.

⁴ Cf. O. Navarre, *Dictionnaire des Antiquités*, s.v. *Pantomimus*.

⁵ *Zosim. hist.*, I, 4, ed. Steph.

⁶ Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 711, F.

giving it a trend of his own. For Bathyllus,¹ of Alexandria, freedman of Maecenas, was a man who hunted out light themes for his comedy-pantomimes, but Pylades,² the Cilician, chose his subjects from tragedy. As has been pointed out in recent years, "hate, love, terror, desire, passion, are the elements on which the dramatic pantomime dance must be founded; joy comes as contrast and is therefore dramatic—but a drama on a farce plan would be grotesque in most instances."³ We have only a few titles⁴ left of the pieces in which Bathyllus and his successors played, and the school founded by him became of far less consequence⁵ than that headed by Pylades, the tragedian.

Lucian speaks with particular enthusiasm of the wideness of the field in choosing subjects for pantomime.⁶ He, like the Russians, goes to Egypt; doubtless he would not have hesitated to go to India where the modern *Le dieu bleu* has its setting. It is natural that a large part of the Roman material should have come from Greek mythology:⁷ that was their dramatic tradition. It is equally natural that among the Russians many of their ideas, less conventional somewhat, and with finer interpretation, should bear a most intimate relation to their tradition, as expressed in that even more direct descendant of the Roman pantomime, the Italian ballet. *Le pavillon d'Armide*, *Le carnaval*, *Les sylphides*, illustrate the more conventional of the present-day ballets. Growing out of this, perhaps, is such a beautiful fancy as *Le spectre de la rose*, to which the Roman list scarcely offers a counterpart. The Romans made less use of their national lore than do the Russians. Yet Nero's dancing of *Turnus*⁸ might not compare ill with a modern representation of *Prince Igor*. *Cléopâtre*, *Narcisse*, *Daphnis and Chloe*, *L'après midi d'un faune*, are themes both old and new. The

¹ Athen., I, 20, e; Dio Cass. liv. 17; Euseb. *chron.* 155; Suid., s.v. *ῥαχῆσις, παντομίμος, Ἀθηνοῦρος*.

² Athen. i. 20 E-F.

³ Brown, *G. Bk. Album*, February, 1911.

⁴ E.g., "Leda" (Juv. vi. 63); "Echo," "A Satyr frolicking with Pan;" Plut. *op. cit.*

⁵ Luc. has no mention of Bathyllus.

⁶ Luc. 30, 37-61.

⁷ Luc. 31.

⁸ Suet. *Nero* liv (performance only promised).

oriental *Scheherazade* of today and the tale of *Mars and Venus Entrapped* have the same foundation. Even one of Nijinsky's later pieces, *Jeux*, with its tennis game, is not too far removed from Lucian's boxing match à la pantomime.¹

The result of comparing the *décor* of the first and twentieth centuries is inevitably to the disadvantage of the former. Such lighting effects were never dreamed of; such scenery; such variety of costume. We have from the past the name of no Léon Bakst. The clear beams of the Italian sun flooded the theater. Scenery,² such as it was, they did have, even painted perhaps,³ the legacy of forgotten dramas. The dancers wore the *palla* and the *tunica talaris*,⁴ for not till the eighteenth century did the skirts of flying gauze develop. Yet these robes, to add grace⁵ and display the figure, were of finest silk.⁶ There is little reason to suppose that there was any great difference in costumes. The masks (not discarded in pantomime till 1772), in marked contrast to those of tragedy and comedy, were not grotesque, but pleasing, and the mouth was closed.⁷

If Stravinsky were to read about the music in the Roman theater of Augustus' time, he might easily grant it little in common with the elaborate compositions of today. It must have served the same purpose in accompanying the dancers, however, and Ovid⁸ is only one of the writers who bears witness to its sensuous, seductive influence on the audience. The flute had been the original instrument, and to that Pylades added the syrinx, cymbals, the lyre, the trumpet, to make the powerful orchestra which the great theater of Pompey demanded.⁹

¹ Luc. 71.

² Luc. 76 (Walls of Thebes).

³ Gregory of Nyssa; see *Am. Jour. Phil.* (1910), p. 105.

⁴ Suet. *Cal.* liv; Fronton, *Ep. ad Marc. Ant. de Orat.* iv. 8.

⁵ Luc. 2.

⁶ Luc. 63.

⁷ Luc. 29, 63; see illustrations in Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, pp. 1160, 1161.

⁸ *Rem. Am.* 751-54; Luc. 2.

⁹ Macrobian. *Saturn.* ii. 7. 18; Cassiod. *Var.* iv. 54; Luc. 68, 72; Arnob. *Adv. Gent.* ii. 38.

But with two other features of the musical side of the pantomime the Russian composer would claim even less relationship. The one is the choir,¹ which sang the words² of the story the actor was dancing. The other is the ancient substitute for the metronome; and iron-souled that orchestra must have been which could govern its tempo at the banging, clattering dictation of the *scabellarii*.³ As nowadays, sometimes the song and music were written for the dance,⁴ but more often probably, as is often the case still, they were cuts from the old plays to which the dancing was then adapted. Justice to the musical critics of the Italian capital demands the statement that they thought the music and song of the pantomimes decidedly mediocre.⁵

What of the acting and dancing for which the scenery, costumes, music, and song were only the background?⁶ "In the new ballet," explains M. Fokine, "the dramatic action is expressed by dances and mimetic in which the whole body plays a part; . . . man can and should be expressive from head to foot."⁷ The Latin says more tersely, "Tot linguae quam membra viro," "loquacissimae manus," "linguosi digiti," "saltare diserte."⁸ The familiar ballet of today lays an undue emphasis on "traditional gesticulations" and proficiency in certain steps and positions. The Russian Ballet, while striving for supreme technical skill, shows the nearest kinship with the best of the Roman pantomime in its effort to make the whole body truly interpret, not a series of words, but the real spirit of whatever it is trying to portray.⁹

¹ Luc. 63; Macrob. *Saturn.* ii. 7. 18.

² Very likely often in Greek; see Macrob. ii. 7. 13; cf. Petron. *Cena Trimal.* 53. Only rarely do we know of poets of note furnishing librettos; e.g., Lucan *Fabulae Salticae* xiv (Welcker, *Die griech. Trag.*, III, 1469); Statius *Agave* (Juv. vii. 86); Abronius Silo (Sen. *Suas.* 2. 19).

³ Suet. *Cal.* liv; Luc. 63, 83; see illustrations in Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, p. 1159.

⁴ Liban. iii. 381 f., ed. Reiske.

⁵ Liban. *op. cit.*; Plut. *quaes. conv.* 748, c; Pliny *Paneg.* 54; Luc. 2, 63.

⁶ Luc. 63.

⁷ *Boston Transcript*, January 8, 1916.

⁸ *Anth. lat.*, I, 622; Cassiod. *Var.* iv. 51; see Quint. xi.

⁹ Luc. 67, 68; cf. Luc. 80, 82, 83 (the work of some second-rate artists); Quint. xi. 88, 89 (not the mere words to be expressed); Macrob. ii. 7. 16; cf. Flitch, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

The most surprising feature in the Roman pantomime is the fact that the whole action was represented by one dancer.¹ When an orchestra was developed from a single flute accompaniment, when a chorus took the part of the soloist, it seems inconceivable that the Romans should have had pantomimes for several hundred years, employing only one actor. He sometimes appeared in five different acts,² representing as many people, men and women, old and young, rich and poor. Moreover, in each scene he must make the audience feel the presence of the others in the tale.³ The fact that the spectators were familiar with many of the stories would assist in the interpretation; but all in all, even with the help of the chorus, this must have been a problem of great difficulty which the modern dancer does not have.⁴ On the other hand, the many difficulties of ensemble-dancing, which the new ballet is trying to solve, did not occur for the Romans.

One of the notable things in the history of the ballet has been the gradual disappearance of male dancers. With the development of the ballet in Russia, we find the danseur taking equal prominence with the danseuse, and the increase in virility which naturally follows. In Rome there were *pantomimae* as early as Seneca's time,⁵ who acted apparently only in private performances, and in a sort of interlude,⁶ but for three centuries and more the parts were taken practically always by men.⁷ In the reign of Justinian we learn of an actress dancing a man's part. Noteworthy, as showing the influence of the pantomime then, we find Theodora,⁸ an actress, wife of Justinian, and empress at Constantinople.

¹ Implied often in Luc. (e.g., 63, 66); cf. Luc. 83—the one place where he refers to a supernumerary.

² Luc. 19, 28, 66, 67; Cassiod. *Var.* iv. 51; Tertul. *Apol.* 19.

³ Luc. 63; Liban. iii. 391. 23 (Reiske).

⁴ Luc. 63, 64; Cassiod. *Var.* i. 20.

⁵ Sen. *Ad Helviam* 12.

⁶ Pliny *N.H.* 7. 158; Cic. *Sest.* 116 and Scholia; *CIL*, VI, 10128; Liban. iii. 372. 31 (Reiske).

⁷ Also in the chorus. Liban. (fourth century) *op. cit.* l. speaks of both men and women; see Baumeister, *Denkmäler*, p. 1160.

⁸ Procopius *Hist. arc.* 60.

The pantomimes had a bad reputation often in Rome. Women especially came under the spell of their attractions;¹ they shared the debaucheries of emperors;² their influence was enormous;³ their public performances of an immoral tendency.⁴ One need hardly suppose that the actors had to face a group of censors sitting in state,⁵ as has been the lot of the Diaghileff Ballet in some American cities. Their difficulty with the police was of a different nature. The "Blues" and "Greens" of the Circus had their parallel in the theater, and the wars of the factions were often bloody.⁶ Periodically during the first two centuries the pantomime actors would be banished from Rome, or have some restraint put on their performances.⁷ On the whole, the emperors were very willing to keep the people out of politics on the *panem et circenses* policy of Augustus.⁸ There were men in those times,⁹ however, who condemned the pantomime-ballet on the same grounds on which complaint is brought today. Historians, pagan and christian,¹⁰ "read into Augustus' introduction of pantomimes, at the beginning of the monarchy, the beginning of a general moral decay of the world. St. Augustine¹¹ ascribes the invention of pantomimes to the far-seeing guile of the devils, who sent this more destructive plague into the world to replace the Circus when the world should grow weary of it." To the same purport the present indictment reads: "In a most subtle manner and under many guises indecency upon the stage is exploited and made profitable. So insidiously are such positions assumed with attractive shibboleths like 'art for

¹ E.g., Domitian's wife (Suet. *Dom.* iii); cf. Juv. vi. 63.

² E.g., Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 19-22, 27; Suet. *Cal.* lv.

³ Juv. vii. 87 ff.; Sen. q.n. vii. 32, 33; *Ep.* 47. 17.

⁴ E.g., Luc. 2.

⁵ Cf. the "Public" as censor, Luc. 72.

⁶ Suet. *Nero* xxvi; Tac. *Ann.* i. 54; Dio Cass. lvii. 14. 10.

⁷ E.g., Suet. *Nero* xvi, xlv; *Dom.* vii; *Tib.* xxxvii; Tac. *Ann.* i. 77.

⁸ Tac. *Ann.* i. 54; Macrobian *Sat.* ii. 7. 19.

⁹ Juv. vi. 63 ff.; Pliny *N.H.* vii. 184; Dio Cass. lvii. 21.

¹⁰ Zosimus i. 6; Tertul. *De Spect.* 269 (ed. Paris). The quotation is from Friedländer.

¹¹ *De civ. Dei*; cf. ii. 20. 32.

art's sake,' that Christians of intellect and position are often deceived."¹

Yet of the new ballet, as a whole, one can say in a closing word from the *περὶ ὀρχήσεως*: "Consider the universality of this art: it sharpens the wits, it exercises the body, it delights the spectator, it instructs him in the history of bygone days, while eye and ear are held beneath the spell of flute and cymbal and of graceful dance."²

¹ *Catholic Theater Movement*, bulletin on the Ballet Russe.

² Luc. 72.

Current Events

[Edited by Clarence W. Gleason, Roxbury Latin School, Boston, Mass., for the territory covered by the Association of New England and the Atlantic States; Daniel W. Lothman, East High School, Cleveland, Ohio, for the Middle States, west to the Mississippi River; Walter Miller, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., for the Southern States; and by Frederick C. Eastman, the University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, for the territory of the Association west of the Mississippi, exclusive of Louisiana and Texas. News from the Pacific Coast may be sent to Miss Juliann A. Roller, Franklin High School, Portland, Oregon. This department will present everything that is properly news—occurrences from month to month, meetings, changes in faculties, performances of various kinds, etc. All news items should be sent to the associate editors named above.]

Idaho

Moscow High School.—In April the Latin department of the high school of Moscow, Idaho, gave a public entertainment, under the direction of Miss Ida M. Yates, and many who came expecting to appreciate little of what was said or done went away pleasantly disappointed.

The prominent features of the program were the dialogue, "A Schoolboy's Dream," from the *Classical Journal*, Miss Paxson's *Roman School*, and a Vestal Virgin drill. There were a few readings, including one in which Virgil and Fish were closely connected, and the beginners were represented in songs sung by the whole department.

Indiana

Indiana University.—On June 13 the faculty and trustees of Indiana University dedicated the memorial tablet in honor of Harold Whetstone Johnston, professor of Latin 1895-1912. The address was given by Professor Francis Willey Kelsey of the University of Michigan on the subject, "The Humanities in American State Universities."

Illinois

The University of Chicago.—The celebration of the Quarter-Centennial of the founding of the University of Chicago was held in June last. A prominent feature of this celebration was the departmental conferences which many of the departments had arranged. The program of the Classical Group, in which the speakers were all University of Chicago doctors, was as follows: "The Relation of the Indirect Question and the Relative Clause in Latin," Alice Freda Bräunlich, Ph.D. (Chicago, 1913), instructor in Latin and German, the Frances Shimer School, Mount Carroll, Illinois; "Caesar's Last Year and Cicero's Correspondence for 45-44 B.C.," Frederick William Shipley, Ph.D. (Chicago, 1901), professor of Latin, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri;

"Horace on Satire," Berthold Louis Ullman, Ph.D. (Chicago, 1908), professor of Latin Language and Literature, University of Pittsburgh; "Aeschylus' *Prometheus* and the Greek Tradition of Egypt," William Arthur Heidel, Ph.D. (Chicago, 1895), professor of Greek, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut; "Ethnology and the Golden Age," George Norlin, Ph.D. (Chicago, 1900), professor of Greek, University of Colorado.

The Philological Group, consisting of the Departments of Greek, Latin, Romance, German, English, and General Literature, held a meeting also, before which the following papers were read: "Jason and Medea—a Psychological study," by Kirby Flower Smith, professor of Latin in Johns Hopkins University; "Classicism and Romanticism," by Irving Babbitt, professor of French Literature in Harvard University.

Joliet.—The Virgil classes of the Joliet Township High School, under the direction of Miss Eldridge and Miss Nielson, recently produced the tragedy of *Dido*, arranged by Dr. Frank J. Miller from Books i and iv of the *Aeneid*. In staging the play the Latin department was ably and graciously assisted by the domestic art and the manual-training departments and by electricians from the science department. The play was given before the whole school, an appreciative audience. Visitors and teachers from other departments highly commended the work of the younger actors and pronounced the entertainment one of the most worth-while which the school has ever given.

Maine

The students of the Latin Department of the University of Maine on May 12 presented the *Phormio* of Terence in English, using a prose translation of the text made for the occasion by Professor George D. Chase of the University. The performance was greatly appreciated by an excellent audience. Special mention is due Miss Alice M. Poore for the fine interpretation of Geta. The department "is convinced that more is gained than lost in presenting an ancient play in English. Classical students get what they lack from class study, an idea of the setting and movement of the play, and non-classical students are able to appreciate the development of the plot and the dramatic unities. There is also no comparison in the labor involved."

New York

The Oakwood Seminary.—On May 27 Miss Anna Jane Maris, instructor in Latin at Oakwood Seminary, entertained her Latin students at a Roman dinner "in triclinio Oakwoodienis Seminarii." The "Responde si vis placere" on the Latin invitations brought forth very interesting notes of acceptance written in Latin.

The walls of the dining-room were decorated with posters made by the classes, to show the value of Latin. On the table the usual silver salt-cellar was in evidence. The menu cards, written in Latin, served also as place cards, the reverse side bearing, in addition to the name, a Latin quotation and

abbreviation which furnished much conversation during the dinner. Between courses Latin songs were sung, a poem was read, and the story of Red Riding Hood was told in Latin.

Before the "mensa secunda" the Greek serving-maids crowned the guests with garlands of flowers. And while "vinum rubrum" (strawberry punch) was served, all sang "Lauriger Horatius" and later, at the close of the dinner, "Gaudeamus Igitur."

Ohio

Columbus.—Miss Margaret Ann Watters, teacher in the Latin department of the East High School, Columbus, Ohio, died on November 28, 1915. At the time of her death Miss Watters was vice-president of the Latin club.

The May meeting of the Columbus Latin club was held at the home of Miss Alice D. Hare, 396 Kendall Place, on Saturday evening, May 27. The principal speaker was Dr. Wallace S. Elden, of the Ohio State University. His subject was "Roman Comedy." Among the guests was Dr. John H. Francis of Los Angeles, superintendent-elect of the Columbus public schools.

The newly elected officers for the coming year are: President, Miss Alice D. Hare of East High School; Vice-President, Mr. Henry S. Lupold of Clinton High School; Secretary-Treasurer, Miss Mary M. Roney of Milo High School.

Hamilton High School.—As an interesting example of the revival of a language regarded by many as dead, several chosen Latin students presented two scenes of *A Roman Wedding* on Monday, May 17, in the auditorium. These pupils had been coached with great care by Mr. M. J. Flannery, Miss Lucile Sharkey, and Miss Mary Heck, teachers of Latin, and the smoothness with which the scenes were produced showed the result of much labor on the part of all participants. The odd forms of the betrothal and wedding ceremonies made a picture of great interest. The vividness of the scenes was heightened by the white costumes of the women, the purple and white of the men, and the colored clothes of the boys.

Aided by good action, and the clear enunciation with which the Latin words were spoken, the audience was delighted to find with what ease they could understand the actors and actresses.

Tennessee

Nashville.—At the tenth annual meeting of the Tennessee Philological Association, held at Vanderbilt University, the following officers were elected for 1916-17: President, Charles E. Little of the George Peabody College for Teachers; Vice-President, J. J. Bassett of Maryville College; Secretary-Treasurer, D. R. Lee of the University of Chattanooga.

Wisconsin

La Crosse High School.—Miss Hester A. Jacobs writes: "The Latin and German clubs had a joint meeting to debate the question: 'Resolved, That the study of Latin in high school is more practical than the study of German.'

There were three judges, one from the Mathematical department, one from the Civics department, and one from the Commerical department. The Latin won, 3 to 0. Of course we had most concrete and damaging evidence in Miss Sabin's *Exhibit*, but there was much original work on the part of the debaters, all of whom were boys.

It was a very lively and interesting discussion and the most interesting fact (to me) about the debate was that from a faculty of forty-three it was very difficult to find three judges who were not prejudiced in favor of Latin.

Washington

Walla Walla High School.—"Discipuli Antiquorum," the Latin club of the Walla Walla High School is just finishing its second year of work, and has fully established itself as one of the foremost organizations of the school.

Last year Miss Paxson's *Roman Wedding* was given with success. The boy who took the part of Cicero displayed unusual ability. Under his energetic leadership this year as president, the club has become well established.

The play given this year, *Caesar and Cleopatra*, by George Bernard Shaw, was by far the most pretentious thing ever given by this high school, and it was a signal success. The entire third act was omitted because its staging was impossible. For the rest of the play two changes of beautiful Egyptian scenery—the one, the courtyard scene showing the exterior of the palace, and the other, the throne-room within the palace—were constructed entirely by the boys of the cast, from designs drawn by a skilled architect, the father of one of the boys. A painter was employed for two days to do the more difficult work of perspective in the massive columns of the throne-room. The result is the most beautiful scenery in the city.

While the boys were at work on the scenery, a number of the girls of the club were busy with the costumes of subordinate characters. The most difficult of the costumes were the many suits of Roman armor, made from strips of light cardboard covered with aluminum paint. The entire scheme of costuming for the king, queen, Roman and Egyptian officers, courtiers, ladies-in-waiting, Roman soldiers, Egyptian guards and slaves, was very carefully worked out, both as to character and as to color. Light-weight outing flannel, sateen, silkolene, and cambric were the materials used, for the most part.

A very capable professional coach was employed for nearly two months, and the result of her work amply justified the expenditure. Every member of the large cast, only three of whom were Seniors, did his work with a poise and ability in interpretation very remarkable for high-school students, and unusual even for older amateur workers. Everyone agrees that it was the best production ever given by the Walla Walla High School.

The advertising was so well managed that a number of people were turned away from the doors after all standing-room in the auditorium had been taken.

The most gratifying feature of the undertaking was the fact that it was not dragged through by the teachers of the department. Everything, from the

beginning to the end, was initiated and accomplished by the officers and committees of the club, with frequent consultation with one of the Latin teachers. The president, who took the part of Caesar in the play, was the compelling force throughout the seven months of work, and the success of the venture was due to him more than to any other one person. The personal development of the boys and girls who assumed the responsibilities has been very apparent, and has made all the hard work worth while. Incidentally the Latin club and department have gained much prestige, and very many pupils have expressed great eagerness to try out for the play next year.

Wisconsin

Fond du Lac High School.—The classical club of the Fond du Lac High School held its fifth annual open meeting on the Ides of April. The first part of the program consisted of three short talks: "The Battle with the Nervii," "The Conspiracy of Catiline," and "The Story of the *Aeneid*." Then came a little Latin play, *Ludus*, from *Decem Fabulae*, which was very cleverly given by two Sophomore and seven Freshmen boys. A merry wedding procession of twenty boys and girls in Roman dress wended its way up and down the aisles, while the bridegroom scattered nuts among his American friends in the audience. At the close the guests were invited to another room where the tenth issue of our Latin newspaper, ambitiously named *Acta Diurna*, had been written on the blackboard and illustrated by artists of the club. An interesting feature was an *extra* in the "Local News" announcing the result of the "English-Derivatives Contest." Some weeks ago the club decided to offer a prize to the Latin Freshman who reported the largest number of English derivatives from a given Latin verb. The winning list contained 367 English words from the Latin *mitto*.

More than three hundred guests attended the open meeting this year, and Latin and non-Latin alike seemed to enjoy the evening.

General Comment

[Edited by Gilbert Campbell Scoggin, of the University of Missouri.]

On June 16 the *Philocletes* of Sophocles was presented in English at Amherst College. The translation was made by Professor Smith and there were included several choral songs composed by Amherst men.

At the meeting of the College Art Association in Philadelphia during the Easter vacation Professor John Pickard of the department of Classical archaeology in the University of Missouri was again elected president.

Professor George Henry Chase has been appointed to the newly established John E. Hudson professorship in archaeology at Harvard. Professor Chase is well known to the readers of the *Classical Journal* by reason of his articles summarizing the work done in the field of classical archaeology from year to year.

Joseph Salathiel Tunison died on April 21 at East Liverpool, Ohio. He was educated at Denison University and early entered the field of journalism. He was known to classical scholars through his book *Master Virgil*, which first appeared in 1888. A very sympathetic notice of his life of devotion to scholarship may be found in the *Nation* for June 15.

George St. John Perrott, long professor of Latin at the University of North Dakota, died on May 30. Professor Perrott was born at Stratford-on-Avon, in England, and received his early education at the famous old grammar school there. Thence he passed on to Oxford and in due course took the Master's degree. He came to America about thirty years ago.

Charles George Herbermann died in New York City on August 24. He was editor-in-chief of the *Catholic Encyclopaedia* and prominent in the Catholic world. Born in Germany, he came early to this country, and here he was educated. A few years after his graduation at St. Francis Xavier College, he became an instructor there. Later he became professor of the Latin language and literature at the College of the City of New York. In 1874 he became librarian of the College but resigned in 1905. He was well known as editor of the *Catiline* and of the *Jugurthine War* of Sallust and was the author of *Business Life in Ancient Rome*.

From the British Isles has recently come the announcement of the death of two distinguished classical scholars, William Ross Hardie and James Leigh Strachan-Davidson. Hardie after graduating from Oxford became Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, and, in 1895, when thirty-three years old, he was elected professor of humanity at the University of Edinburgh. He will be remembered for his *Lectures on Classical Subjects*, published by Macmillan in 1903. Strachan-Davidson was Master of Balliol College, and, like Hardie, had been Fellow and Tutor there. He was distinguished for his studies in Roman criminal law and was author and editor of many works, including *Selections from Polybius*, the first book of *Appian*, and *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law*.

The death has been announced of Professor Paul Wendland of the University of Göttingen. He studied at the Sophiengymnasien in Berlin where he came under the instruction of Oskar Seyffert of *Classical Dictionary* fame, and there his interest in classical philology was aroused. In 1882 he entered the University of Berlin and there studied under Kirschhof and Vahlen. Then after a brief sojourn at Bonn, where he attended the lectures of Michaelis, he returned to Berlin and took his degree. His first university appointment was at Kiel. Later he went to Breslau and in 1909 went to Göttingen, where he died on September 10, 1915. He was particularly interested in Philo Judaeus, and in conjunction with Dr. Leopold Cohn he has given us the latest critical edition of the works of that writer (Berlin, 1896-1902).

At the third meeting of the Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of Liberal Studies, held February 26, 1915, Professor Charles Knapp of Columbia University discussed "Liberal Studies in Ancient Rome." Many interesting parallels are drawn between the ancient Romans and the modern Americans, especially in their attitude toward liberal studies. To a Roman who was ambitious for making his way in the world, literature could be merely an avocation. Cicero recognized this attitude of his countrymen and made open apologies for his own studies in philosophy. Cicero's success, however, was largely due to his own pursuit of liberal studies. Although the Romans long were hostile toward such studies, yet, as it is pointed out, their greatest achievements were long due to these very studies. This address in full may be found in the *Educational Review* for March, 1916.

In the *Educational Review* for April, 1916, under the title "The Genius of Ancient Greece and Its Influence on the Modern World," there is an interesting description of the Oxford summer meeting of 1915. Many familiar names will be found among the lecturers there enumerated. Dr. Mahaffy lectured on the "Expansion of Greek History"; Dr. Macan spoke on "Aspects of and Epochs

of Greek History"; Mr. Marriott spoke on "The Commonwealth and the Citizen"; Professor Gilbert Murray lectured on "Greek Tragedy"; Dr. Wicksteed discussed "The Religious Significance of the Greek Tragedians"; Mr. Livingstone lectured on "Oratory and Greek Prose Style"; Professor Percy Gardner discussed several topics, including "Greek Coins"; Dr. Farnell lectured on the "Greek Mysteries and on Apollo Worship." Only two Americans seem to have been in attendance at this Oxford summer meeting.

Professor Hugo Blümner, of Zürich, writes on *Die Darstellung des Sterbens in der griechischen Kunst* in the *Neue Jahrbücher* for February, 1916. He treats of the representation of death on the monuments through a period of six centuries, but he points out that full material for such a study is not at hand. There are breaks in tradition as preserved for us. However, certain general characteristics emerge from time to time. The fifth and fourth centuries were averse to depicting death struggles and tried to tone down such scenes. The Hellenistic age delighted in portraying in detail the sufferings and agony of a dying man. Violent death is depicted; never mild, easy death such as might come through sickness or natural dissolution. Gentle death such as is found depicted on Roman sarcophagi may have been found, however, on Greek fore-runners now lost. Greek art seldom portrays death other than that suffered in battle. Thirty-three fine illustrations from the monuments accompany the text.

The Harvard University library has recently received by bequest the fine collection of editions of Horace brought together by the late W. C. Williamson of the class of 1852. These books, many in fine bindings, range in date from 1501 to 1900, no incunabula being included. The earliest of these is a copy of the Aldine edition, which is now of great rarity. There is also a copy of the Elzevir edition of 1676, the rarest of the Elzevir editions of Horace. Pickering is represented by a copy of his diamond-type edition, the smallest Horace ever printed. Included is also a copy of Baskerville's quarto of 1770, the rarest of Baskerville's beautiful editions of the classics. Naturally there is a copy of Pine's famous engraved edition, which was published in 1733. It was a copy of this last that inspired Eugene Field to compose his amusing verses beginning: "When I was broke in London in the fall of eighty-nine." This notable collection of more than one hundred volumes may fitly take its place beside the excellent Persius collection brought together and presented to the college library by Professor Morgan.

In the January number of the *Baylor Bulletin*, Dr. J. W. Downer has issued "A Plea for Latin." Various arguments are offered in defense of the study of Latin. It is an aid to the mastery of English because an accurate knowledge of Latin grammar gives mastery of English grammar. It leads

to a knowledge of the derivation of English words, develops the powers of expression and of the language sense. It is an aid to mental development. These are emphasized as the chief reasons for the study of Latin. Perhaps few will agree with Dr. Downer that even in college "the main reason for the study of Latin is not for literature, though there is much charming and helpful literature there." In the same way the historical value of Latin is unduly obscured. But he has some sensible remarks about the common chatter about research. The value of Latin for the professions and the sciences is noted. He answers many objections to the study of Latin and shows that the deficiencies of college Freshmen are in large measure due to the widely extended prejudice against Latin in their homes. The shortcomings of teachers also are rightly pointed out and remedies suggested.

The fact that our schools and colleges are filled with students who can never have high intellectual interests,

such as for their bellies' sake
Creep, and intrude, and climb into the fold,

should not blind one to the fact that things intellectual must always make appeal to the intellectual, and the classics will ever have fit audience though few. College barriers are now down and even he who does not read may run to college, and our classrooms are filled with herds and hordes. A real danger lies in the fact that we may be inclined to accept the loudly proclaimed doctrines of "the new education" as a final verdict, whereas we should stand up and defend the right. In this conflict there can be no neutrality. False and ignorant statements should not be allowed to go unchallenged. The torch of humanism has been transmitted to us through many succeeding generations. It has at times burned low even to the point of flickering, but there have always heretofore been courageous champions to guard the sacred flame and in no former age has it been allowed to be extinguished.

At the meeting of the Classical Association in Chicago last April a healthy tone of optimism prevailed throughout. Some years ago I attended a meeting of the same organization, hoping to derive inspiration and encouragement from contact with many others who were engaged in one great common cause. Most of the papers and discussions, however, took the form of lamentations about the present widespread unpopularity of classical study, and I returned home so despondent that it was five years before I had the heart to attend another meeting. Now my own reading in the history of classical studies had led me to see long since that the oft-regretted golden age in which Latin and Greek were eagerly sought by the schoolboy and to the end enthusiastically

pursued was a myth. So far as I am aware, there was never a time when classical studies were popular. Greek in particular has always been forced to intrench its position. When one considers the growth of popular education with its demands, its just demands, for practical things, the mere fact that today in every college community classical studies through their representatives have such influence, for me is proof enough, if external proof were required, that the classics have a lasting value that cannot be obscured. I have long been convinced of the vitality of classical studies and am of opinion that never before have such studies been more successfully pursued than at the present day. The position of Greek has always been a reliable index to the true condition of classical studies and no preceding generation can marshal a larger number of first-rate Greek scholars than can our own. "Sed de vivis nil ne bonum quidem."

Timely stories from the entire field of art, ancient and modern, profusely illustrated with full-page typo-gravures, combine to give the May number of *Art and Archaeology* the widest appeal to all lovers of the beautiful.

Of particular interest and value is the third of Dr. Edgar J. Banks's series on the "Seven Wonders of the Ancient World." The third "Wonder" is "The Statue of the Olympian Zeus." The first of the series of two articles on "The Sculptor Myron in the Light of Recent Discoveries" by George H. Chase is with eight illustrations, this number considering the "Discus-Thrower" (discobolus). Professor W. H. Holmes has an illuminating article entitled "The Oldest Dated American Monument" (A Nephrite Figurine from Mexico). A second article by Professor Holmes considers some "Guatemalan Pottery," which he gives as "Examples of Spurious Antiquities." Dan Fellows Platt gives us the seventh of his "Lesser Known Masterpieces of Italian Painting," considering in this number the famous "Kneeling Angel" of Bernardino Luini. Mrs. George Julian Zolnay ("Rowan Douglas") writes suggestively about the Zolnay frieze in the Central High School, Washington. John Pickard records the "Fifth Annual Meeting of the College Art Association of America." A finely illustrated article by Clarence Stratton, the feature of the issue, considers "Greek Influence on the Stage." There is also a striking poem, "Hermes," by Juanita Tramana.

"Current Notes and News" deals with an "Exhibition of American Institute of Graphic Arts," "A Note of Irish Coinage," "The Jumel Mansion in New York," "A Coptic Wall Painting," "Representation of Death in Greek Art," "Excavations in the Southwest," "Joseph E. Widener Buys the Mazarin Tapestry," and "Art and Archaeology Week of the Chautauqua [N.Y.] Assembly."

Book Reviews

A Companion to Greek Studies. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press by LEONARD WHIBLEY, M.A. 3d ed., revised and enlarged. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. Pp. 787. \$6.25.

This book is neither a classical dictionary nor a handbook of Greek antiquities. It is rather a classical reference library packed into 787 pages. The *Companion to Greek Studies* was undertaken by the Syndics of the University Press with the intention of presenting in one volume such information (apart from that contained in histories and grammars) as would be most useful to the student of Greek literature. History is, however, not entirely neglected. The material is presented in a series of independent essays written by specialists. Though packed with information, they are not mere summaries but well-written articles. The editor has succeeded in preserving a proper proportion between the various parts. The use of the book is hampered by the lack of an *index rerum*. Such words as "oaths," "ostracism," "liturgy," "antidosis," and many others are not to be found in the indices except in the Greek form. The subjects of the chapters are as follows: i, "Geography, Ethnology [not in previous editions], Fauna, Flora"; ii, "History (Chronology and Chronological Tables)"; iii, "Literature (Including the Roman Age), Philosophy, Science"; iv, Art (Including Bronzes and Jewellery Which Appear Now for the First Time); v, "Mythology and Religion"; vi, "Public Antiquities"; vii, "Private Antiquities"; viii, "Criticism and Interpretation."

As a test of the scope of the work and the thoroughness of the revision I looked up the *Oxyrhynchia Hellenica* discovered after the publication of the first edition. It is not mentioned in the revised section on Literature, nor among the sources in the section on History. Full use is made of the document in the section on Constitutions, but it has not been used in the chronological tables to correct the date of Timocrates' mission to Greece at the instance of Pharnabazus, not Tithraustes. Adcock, the reviser of Wyse's admirable article on Law, has brought it up to date so far as the Cretan Codes are concerned. The following statements should have been modified: "Nothing was admissible at the trial that was not in writing and had not been disclosed at the ἀνάκρισις." "All testimonial evidence was presented in the shape of written depositions!" No opinion is expressed on the relationship of the arbitrators to the magistrates, except the Forty. As this question has been raised recently, a more explicit statement might have been given.

R. J. B.

Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik von Johannes Vahlen. Neudruck besorgt von HERMANN SCHÖNE. Leipzig. Berlin, 1914. Pp. viii+362.

In view of the results accomplished during the last half-century in all lines of classical philology, a new edition at this time of almost any work in the field of classical scholarship published fifty years ago would furnish occasion for some surprise. But when it is concerned with the interpretation of Aristotle's *Poetics*, a work that has been so carefully studied by a long line of distinguished scholars, the confidence of the editor in the value of his undertaking is so great as to amount to a challenge.

Vahlen's *Beiträge* was published originally in 1865, and the present edition by Schöne shows absolutely no change in the text or notes on the text. Vahlen himself had contemplated a revision of the work, we are told in the introduction, but as he had forbidden all use of his notes, the present edition differs from the original only in certain mechanical changes and additions intended to make the work of greater value to the student. The *Anmerkungen*, originally appended to each of the four books into which the work is divided, are more conveniently placed together at the close of the book, an index of proper names and another of passages quoted from Greek and Latin authors are added, and in the margin of the text are placed references to volume and page of the *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie*, in which the *Beiträge* first appeared. At the head of each page is given the chapter of the *Poetics* with which the text deals, a more convenient designation often than the paging of Bekker, which is found in the body of the text. A list of the works of Vahlen on Aristotle, a brief table of contents, and an occasional reference in the text to a later edition of some article referred to there complete the list of points in which this edition differs from the one published almost exactly fifty years before.

The name Vahlen is well known to all students of the *Poetics*. It was he who established beyond all question the superiority of the Paris manuscript, and the appearance of his *Beiträge* in 1865 marked an epoch in the modern study of Aristotle. Since the work is so well known and its results are embodied in all modern editions of the *Poetics*, it seems superfluous to review it in detail. The best that the reviewer can do, perhaps, is to indicate in general outline for those who are not specialists what the book is, and how far it seems to be of present and permanent value for the student of Aristotle.

The *Beiträge* is a close and detailed examination of the *Poetics* based upon sound textual considerations, in the attempt to discern and make clear the meaning of the author at every step. It is in the form of a running commentary, often retarded by pages of close reasoning upon the interpretation of doubtful passages, illuminated frequently by pertinent quotations from the *Rhetoric* or other works of Aristotle. There are many questions suggested by the *Poetics*, some of which will probably never be answered beyond possibility of revision, questions as to the authenticity of the text, as to lacunae, trans-

positions, and interpolations. Here and there are baffling allusions to previous statements whose reference is far from clear. To the solution of all these problems Vahlen applied himself with a critical judgment so keen, and at the same time so cautious, that in spite of all the efforts of later scholars, the *Beiträge* still remains one of the best expositions of this much-studied work, and few of the conclusions that its author reached have been disproved, though some have not found general acceptance. Among the interpretations of Vahlen that were of special interest to the reviewer, because differing more or less from those commonly put forth, may be mentioned his discussion of the meaning of *ἄδη*, 1450 a13, as "types" rather than "elements," as commonly translated; his treatment of the perplexing passage 1455 b32 ff., where the general assumption of a lacuna has made it a matter of guesswork to determine the fourth of the kinds of tragedy enumerated by Aristotle; and his interpretation of the term *περιέρεα*, chap. 11, which he defines as "reversal of intention," that is, when the unexpected thing arises from an action distinctly intended to produce the opposite effect. The exact meaning of this last term is still a matter of controversy, but Vahlen's view has found supporters in Germany and England. It is discussed quite fully by Butcher in his *Theory of Poetry*, pp. 329 ff., and by Bywater in his note on this passage.

In conclusion it may be said that the present-day student hardly needs to read the *Beiträge* to become acquainted with what modern scholarship has achieved in interpreting the *Poetics*, including the work of Vahlen himself. All modern editions include in their critical apparatus the conjectures of Vahlen, and no commentator ignores his interpretations. By comparing a list of the passages or words discussed by Vahlen with the notes in Bywater's edition, the reviewer found that every one of importance was referred to. In Butcher's edition everything that is in point for his discussion finds a place in the notes, and probably the same thing is true of other standard editions. The student of Aristotle's *Theory of Poetry* cannot proceed far without reaping the benefit of much that Vahlen has done, but on the other hand there is much in the *Beiträge* itself that repays careful reading, and to the close student of Aristotle Schöne has undoubtedly done a service in editing the *Beiträge* with a clearer type and with the improvements and additions indicated.

AMY L. BARBOUR

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Latin Satirical Writing Subsequent to Juvenal. By ARTHUR H. WESTON. A thesis presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University in candidacy for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Lancaster, Pa.: New Era Printing Co., 1915. Pp. 165.

This dissertation is very interesting and readable. Dr. Weston has done a good piece of work. A ten-page introduction clears the ground. Only

the Latin of the Later Empire is to be included. Satire of the mixed type used by Pacuvius and Ennius is to be set aside and the term "satire" is to include that which, whether in prose or verse, has the underlying motive of ethical criticism. In the discussion of Apollinaris Sidonius, however, the author departs from this principle and discusses only the *Carmina*, not the *Epistulae*, in which there are many satiric touches on the same subjects which Sidonius discusses in the *Carmina*.

Satire in the first century was not confined to Horace, Persius, and Juvenal and it lived on in the works of many later writers of no mean ability. This later material Dr. Weston examines to see "what forms it took, what subjects it dealt with, and the nature of its treatment of those subjects." The interest of the volume lies not least in the pictures of manners portrayed in the passages selected for quotation. The reviewer's impression is that stress is laid on the subjects satirized rather than on the method or the character of the satire, though these are not ignored.

After a brief chapter on minor poets contemporary with Juvenal, Dr. Weston discusses some twenty-three writers from Apuleius to Salvianus, particular stress being laid upon Apuleius, Tertullian, Commodianus, Arnobius, Prudentius, Ambrosius, Hieronymus, Claudian, Rutilius Namatianus, Apollinaris Sidonius, and Salvianus.

At the close of the dissertation there is a perhaps unnecessarily copious bibliography of some six pages. The author does not seem to have used Dill's *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, although Dill's second, third, and fourth chapters of Book II deal with the society of Symmachus, Ausonius, and Apollinaris Sidonius respectively. Professor Kellogg's paper on "Satirical Elements in Rutilius Namatianus," abstracted in *PAPA*, p. xxxv, should have been mentioned.

The author is inconsistent and almost tantalizing in the method of presenting his material. Sometimes he quotes without translation, or paraphrase, sometimes he gives us a loose paraphrase, sometimes something which is too close for a paraphrase but is misleading as a translation, for a line here and a mere phrase or a word there are omitted. Throughout the chapter on Prudentius, the method is consistent with itself, long passages of Latin text being given with occasional paraphrase. That method should have been maintained throughout the dissertation.

JOSEPH WILLIAM HEWITT

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Recent Books

Foreign books in this list may be obtained of Lemcke & Buechner, 30-32 West 27th St., New York City; G. E. Stechert & Co., 151-55 West 25th St., New York City; F. C. Stechert Co., 29-35 West 32d St., New York City.

- BISHOP, J. R., and JONES, T. T. *The Story of Caesar's Gallic War*. Chicago: Lyons & Carnahan. 12mo, pp. 452. \$1.25.
- BLOMFIELD, H. G. *The Argonautica of Gaius Valerius Flaccus Sotinus Balous*. Book I. Translated in English prose, with Introduction and Notes. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell. Cr. 8vo, pp. 148. 3s. 6d. net.
- BOWIE, W. C. *Caesar's Wars with the Germans*. (Part of Caesar's *Gallic War*.) Adapted and edited with Introduction, Notes, Exercises, and Vocabularies. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell. 18mo, pp. 98. 1s. 6d. net.
- FOWLER, H. N. *A History of Sculpture*. New York: Macmillan. Pp. 34+445. \$2.00 net.
- GAME, JOSIAH B. *Teaching High-School Latin*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Cr. 8vo, pp. x+120.
- HOFFMAN, S. A. *A Handbook of Greek and Roman History*. Chicago: Curtis-Johnson. 16mo, pp. 5+112. \$0.75.
- LINDSAY, W. M. *Notae Latinae*. An Account of Abbreviation in Latin MSS of the Early Minuscule Period (ca. 700-850). New York: Putnam. 8vo, pp. 24+500. \$6.00 net.
- LOWE, W. D., and FREEMAN, C. E. *Rome and Her Kings*. (Oxford Elementary Latin Readers.) Oxford: H. Milford. 18mo. 1s. 6d.
- MANNING, C. A. *A Study of Archaism in Euripides*. (Columbia University Studies in Classical Philology.) New York: Lemcke & Buechner. Pp. 98. \$1.25 net.
- MAUREL, A. *A Month in Rome*. Translated by HELEN GERARD. 116 Illustrations and 32 Maps. New York: Putnam. Pp. 21+401. \$1.75 net.
- NAYLOR, H. D. *More Latin and English Idiom*. An Object-Lesson from Livy xxxiv. 1-8. New York: Putnam. 12mo, pp. 8+220. \$1.10 net.
- POTTEAT, H. M. *Selected Letters of Cicero*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co. Pp. xii+201. \$1.00.
- ROGERS, B. B. *The Wasps of Aristophanes*. Greek Text Revised, with Translation in Corresponding Meters, Introduction, and Commentary. New York: Macmillan. 8vo, pp. 52+244. \$3.25 net.
- STOBERT, J. C. *The Glory That Was Greece*. A Survey of Hellenic Culture and Civilization. 2d ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott. 8vo, pp. 290. \$2.00 net.
- THOMPSON, J. A. K. *The Greek Tradition*. Essays in the Reconstruction of Ancient Thought, with a Preface by GILBERT MURRAY. New York: Macmillan. Pp. 13+248. \$1.50 net.
- WHIBLEY, L. *A Companion to Greek Studies*. 3d ed., revised and enlarged. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8vo, pp. 824. 21s. net.